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AWARENESS OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING AS A DIAGNOSTIC TOOL FOR 
MILD COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT AND ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 
 
Jeremy Stark Carmasin 
 
June 26, 2014 
 
This study examined the utility of older adults’ awareness of their executive 
functioning abilities to predict future cognitive decline. The recently revised Cognitive 
Awareness Model (CAM) forms the conceptual background of this approach, and 
suggests that executive dysfunction disrupts awareness in a manner distinct from episodic 
memory dysfunction. The study design examined how awareness of executive 
functioning ability may predict both continuous decline on neuropsychological testing 
and qualitative change in diagnostic status. This form of prediction was tested using a 
longitudinal sample (n = 661) of older adults with either normal cognition, mild cognitive 
impairment (MCI), or Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Executive functioning awareness was 
operationalized as Everyday Cognition (ECog) questionnaire discrepancy scores, made 
up of the difference between informant and subject reports of daily task efficiency. 
Executive functioning discrepancy scores were shown to have moderate utility at 
predicting cognitive decline on several measures and modest utility at predicting 
diagnostic change. However, modest convergent validity and low discriminant validity 
were observed for executive functioning discrepancy scores in the context of memory 




document the time course of early memory awareness deficits vs. early executive 







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
                                   
            





LIST OF TABLES...........................................................................................................viii 
































LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
TABLE                 PAGE 
 
1. Study Sample Characteristics and Correlations with ECog Scales – Normal and MCI Subjects….....….74 
 
2. Linear Regression Model of ECog EF Predicting Logical Memory.…...…..............................................75 
 
3. Linear Regression Model of ECog EF Predicting Trail Making Part B….................................................76 
 
4. Linear Regression Model of ECog EF Predicting RAVLT........................................................................77   
 
5. Linear Regression Model of ECog EF Predicting ADAS-Cog..………………………………………....78  
 
6. Linear Regression Model of ECog EF Predicting Clock Drawing……………………………………….79  
 
7. Logistic Regression Models of ECog EF Predicting Diagnostic Conversion……………………………80 
 
8. Study Sample Characteristics and Correlations with ECog Scales – All Subjects……………………….81  
 
9. Path Model Comparisons of ECog EF Prediction…………….………………………………………….82 
 
10. Linear Regression Model of ECog Memory Predicting Logical Memory…………….…………..........83 
 
11. Linear Regression Model of ECog Memory Predicting Trail Making Part B…………….…………….84 
 
12. Linear Regression Model of ECog Memory Predicting RAVLT………..…………….………………..85 
 
13. Linear Regression Model of ECog Memory Predicting ADAS-Cog…………….……………………..86 
 
14. Linear Regression Model of ECog Memory Predicting Clock Drawing………………….……………87 
 
15. Logistic Regression Models of ECog Memory Predicting Diagnostic Conversion………………….....88 
 








LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
FIGURE              PAGE 
 
1. Cognitive Awareness Model (CAM)…………………………..…………………………………….…...90 
 
2. Histogram of normal and MCI executive functioning discrepancy scores….…………………….…..….91 
 
3. Histogram of normal and MCI memory discrepancy scores……………………………………….…….92 
 
4. Month 12 normal memory model of ECog executive functioning discrepancy prediction.......................93 
 
5. Month 12 impaired memory model of ECog executive functioning discrepancy prediction…………….94 
 
6. Month 24 normal memory model of ECog executive functioning discrepancy prediction……………...95 
 










Defining and modeling awareness 
Overview of decline in mild cognitive impairment and Alzheimer’s disease. 
The prevalence of both mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and Alzheimer’s disease 
(AD) increases with age, with both disorders most frequently diagnosed in people age 65 
and older. MCI is a syndrome involving either 1) memory impairment in the context of 
otherwise normal cognitive functioning, or 2) no memory impairment, but impairment in 
one or more other cognitive domains. In both MCI permutations, the patient retains 
normal functional abilities in the context of their age and level of physical disability. An 
estimated 8-55% of people with MCI will convert to AD within five years of receiving an 
MCI diagnosis (Collie, Maruff, & Currie, 2002). In research and clinical practice, MCI is 
often a transition between normal aging and early-stage AD, but is also considered 
distinct from both. Under the most recently proposed National Institute on Aging – 
Alzheimer’s Association (NIA-AA) clinical diagnostic criteria, MCI requires “concern 
regarding a change in cognition” from a patient, a close informant, or a skilled clinician 
who has observed the patient. (A patient’s own concerns may also be labeled “self-
reports” or “subjective complaints.”) The patient must also display impairment in 
memory, executive functioning, visuospatial skills, attention, or language. They may 
display some reduced efficiency or accuracy at these tasks compared to previous reports. 




occupational function, or independent living (e.g. paying bills, cooking, etc.; Albert et al., 
2011). 
Although some older adults with MCI do not experience further cognitive decline, 
AD is explicitly a degenerative illness. Early stage AD involves the gradual deterioration 
of cognitive abilities. The earliest symptoms of AD include substantial difficulty with 
memory and instrumental activities of daily life (e.g. driving, shopping for food), as well 
as an increase in apathy and confusion in unfamiliar situations. Although the most 
prominent losses typically involve memory, the disease also affects the domains of 
language, attention, and executive functioning. Middle and late stage AD patients 
continue to decline in the above areas, but also show more pronounced behavior changes 
and confusion. The combination of these declines persisting for several months is 
considered dementia (Welsh-Bohmer & Warren, 2006).  
Both MCI and AD represent difficulty in cognitive domains beyond what is 
expected in normal aging (Welsh-Bohmer & Warren, 2006). Earlier diagnosis of these 
disorders is valuable for research (more opportunities for larger subject samples and 
longitudinal data collection) and clinical practice (a longer period of time to employ 
medication, psychotherapy, and behavioral interventions; Bradford, Kunik, Schulz, 
Williams, & Singh, 2009). Additionally, earlier diagnosis entails earlier financial benefits 
for patients and health care providers, such as access to insurance benefits from programs 
such as Medicare (Weimer & Sager, 2009). Improving diagnostic accuracy will likely 






Overview of executive functioning 
 Executive functioning is a broad term for the regulation and management of other 
cognitive processes in order to achieve goals. Executive functioning incorporates 
attention, organization, cognitive flexibility, and error monitoring. Strongly associated 
with the state of the frontal lobe, it is critical to the planning and execution of actions 
(Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou, & Chen, 2008).  
A lack of longitudinal data has impeded the study of executive functioning across 
the life span. However, components of executive functioning appear to decline in a 
heterogeneous manner with age, e.g. organization may remain intact despite deficits in 
inhibition. Additionally, diagnosing a deficit as primarily executive requires ruling out 
other potential contributors, e.g. difficulty in accessing episodic memory (Jurado & 
Rosselli, 2007). In sum, it is useful to assess executive functioning in multiple 
components, as well as directly compare performance on executive measures to those of 
other cognitive tests. 
Historically, it has been challenging to draw specific conclusions from executive 
functioning measures. Ecological validity is a problem in executive functioning 
assessment because complex tasks in daily life require a complex series of steps, 
including goal-setting, prioritization, and inhibition. Successful executive functioning 
integrates several of these abilities in the service of an objective. Poor performance on a 
single measure of executive functioning indicates impairment, but does not determine 
which of the many processes employed between goal identification and completion are 




The relationship between executive functioning and instrumental tasks in daily 
life is well understood in later stages of cognitive impairment (Goel, Grafman, Tajik, 
Gana, & Danto, 1997; Grafman & Litvan, 1999), but less so in earlier stages such as MCI 
(Ready, Ott, Grace, & Cahn-Weiner, 2003). Gathering context through patient and/or 
informant reports allows executive functioning measures to better highlight impairment at 
any stage. For example, studies might add context by querying subjects on their success 
at specific abilities (shopping, driving, paying bills, etc.). Asking several such direct 
questions as opposed to abstract perceptions of general success at executive tasks should 
generate more relevant connections between a subject’s performance on standardized 
measures and their success at daily tasks (Farias et al., 2013).   
 
Definitions of awareness in MCI and AD 
Asking subjects questions about their daily tasks is one form of gauging their 
awareness, which may be used as an indicator or predictor of cognitive decline. Some 
terms describe awareness for a specific cognitive domain, e.g. metamemory: patients’ 
monitoring of their own memory performance and their knowledge of the memory 
strategies they employ (Clare, 2004b; Frank, Lenderking, Howard, & Cantillon, 2011; 
Marková & Berrios, 2006). Lack of awareness is distinct from concepts such as lack of 
concern, anosodiaphoria, and indifference, which each indicate a diminished emotional 
response to decline rather than diminished awareness. 
Awareness is the ability to reconcile new information about one’s actions and 
environment with well-established information within one’s self-knowledge (Agnew & 




understood by examining its absence. Damage to various brain regions, such as the 
entorhinal cortex and hippocampus in the medial temporal lobe, can disturb cognitive 
domains such as memory, language, and executive functioning during the insidious 
progression of AD (Braak & Braak, 1991). Many patients express a lack of awareness of 
these deficits (i.e. anosognosia), ranging for overestimating their abilities to explicitly 
rejecting the presence of decline (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989). If an older adult can 
accurately describes their abilities within a cognitive domain (“good,” “okay,” “poor,” 
etc.), then they have “explicit awareness” about that domain.  In contrast, having 
“implicit awareness” refers to an incomplete state of self-knowledge, wherein affect 
and/or behavior may change in response to new information, but there is no conscious 
recognition of the new information. For example, a woman might insist that she has no 
memory impairment, but also attempt to avoid any memory-dependent tasks (Agnew & 
Morris, 1998; Clare et al., 2011). 
Awareness should not be conceptualized as an all-or-nothing phenomenon: 
Patients can be aware of difficulty in some domains but not others, or even inconsistently 
aware of difficulty within the same domain, e.g. complaints of difficulty with verbal 
memory but not visual memory (Mograbi, Brown, & Morris, 2009). Memory deficits 
alone typically do not account for lack of awareness in AD (Ecklund-Johnson & Torres, 
2005). Rather, awareness in AD is frequently impaired due to a combination of cognitive 
difficulties. Episodic memory gradually deteriorates in AD, yet many patients deny 
cognitive problems even when they are unable to recall any recent events. Anosognosia 




understanding how other people view them), further hindering their ability to adapt to 
feedback on their cognitive performance (Salmon et al., 2005).  
An improved understanding of awareness in the context of MCI and AD will 
ultimately increase awareness’s viability as a diagnostic tool. Aspects of awareness that 
decline predictably with observable cognitive changes may be especially useful to study 
(Clare, Marková, Verhey, & Kenny, 2005). MCI and AD are currently diagnosed through 
a combination of patient reports, informant reports, neuropsychological testing, 
neuroimaging, and/or biomarkers such as blood sampling. Awareness increasingly 
appears to be a useful tool to distinguish between normal aging, MCI, and early stages of 
AD: The level of awareness deficit varies within both MCI and early-stage AD 
(Cosentino, Metcalfe, Butterfield, & Stern, 2007; Roberts, Clare, & Woods, 2009). This 
variance suggests that changes in awareness may reveal cognitive decline. 
 
Subject/informant discrepancy scores 
Awareness is a complex concept. Cognitive complaints and anosognosia have 
been operationalized in studies of MCI and AD in numerous ways, including subjective 
ratings from a subject or informant, and discrepancy scores between subject and 
informant ratings. Awareness is frequently gauged using a subject or informant’s answers 
to a questionnaire, which may be in a Yes/No, Likert scale, or other format. This 
approach is typically combined with at least one objective measure of performance, such 
as the subject’s score on a neuropsychological test. Some awareness questionnaires have 
also been operationalized into discrepancy ratings: an informant (typically a family 




completes the same questionnaire as the subject. Such scores are frequently calculated 
through simple subtraction, such as Informant Score – Subject Score. The result can then 
be interpreted on a continuum, such as large, positive scores meaning the informants 
rated much more impairment than the subjects. Discrepancy scores assume that an 
informant provides an accurate and valid rating of the subject’s performance, and that any 
instances where the subject reports better functioning than the informant represents an 
overestimation of the subject’s ability (Clare et al., 2005). For this study, a “significant 
discrepancy” or “greater discrepancy” indicates the subject significantly overestimated 
ability compared to the informant unless otherwise noted.  
The discrepancy method has shown moderate effectiveness to date, though 
reliability is a frequent concern. Specifically, individual differences in informant 
personality, as well as differences in the nature of the relationship between subject and 
informant, appear to sway informant ratings (Clare, 2004a; Green, Goldstein, Sirockman, 
& Green, 1993). However, unreliable informant reports may be a result of measures with 
very broad questions, e.g. “Does your spouse/parent/friend/etc. have trouble with their 
memory?” It may be unreasonable to expect informants to know what "normal" memory 
means for an older adult. “Normal” must be contextualized by a variety of factors, such 
as level of education and medical history. Additionally, study informants may be biased 
by stereotypes and anecdotal evidence regarding other older adults’ cognitive abilities. 
Measurement via direct, unambiguous functional questions should improve the accuracy 
of the discrepancy method. Moreover, questionnaires could ask for a comparison to a 
subject’s performance several years in the past, rather than asking (explicitly or 




respondent to serve as their own control in a salient manner. For example, the respondent 
can indicate that, although the subject has a poor memory for directions, this does not 
represent a decline from the previous decade – the subject has always had a poor memory 
for directions (Farias et al., 2008; Schinka, 2010). 
 
Awareness assessment requires integrating more than memory 
As discussed earlier, memory is a critical piece of dementia-related decline, and is 
therefore intertwined with awareness of said decline. In a recent review, the overt 
expression of awareness of impairment was found to be very low at late stages of 
dementia (Clare, 2010). Another review found that larger memory awareness discrepancy 
scores between patients and caregivers have been observed in later stages of impairment. 
However, memory deficits alone did not account for lack of awareness in milder stages of 
AD, as observed in studies of patients with amnesic deficits who retained high awareness 
of memory impairment (Ecklund-Johnson & Torres, 2005). A focus on anosognosia for 
memory to the exclusion of other cognitive domains may be part of the problem: 
Historically, anosognosia for memory has not consistently been related to objective 
memory test performance in MCI and mild AD (Mograbi et al., 2009).  
Memory tests that exclusively involve recall and recognition (e.g. memorization 
of a word list followed by immediate and delayed retrieval trials) may not be sufficiently 
effortful to distinguish between normal and impaired memory.  For example, a traditional 
recognition task would involve a prompt such as “Say Yes if you heard this word earlier.” 
A more effortful task could state “Say Yes only if this item was presented to you as a 




older adults and mild AD patients each completed an anosognosia questionnaire and were 
then shown several stimuli, some presented as text and others presented as pictures. Both 
healthy controls and mild AD patients appeared able to distinguish between studied and 
not-studied items. However, the mild AD patients displayed difficulty recalling the 
presentation format (in the above case, text vs. pictures). Among the mild AD patients, 
greater anosognosia appears correlated with greater difficulty in this comparatively 
complex task but not in the simple recognition task (Gallo, Chen, Wiseman, Schacter, & 
Budson, 2007).  
The combination of poor effortful task ability and poor memory self-knowledge 
may be interpreted as dysfunction within the frontal lobe. This region is critical in 
making accurate evaluations of one’s own memory (Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005), and 
dysfunction within the frontal lobe is associated with deficits in both executive 
functioning and self-monitoring (Antoine, Antoine, Guermonprez, & Frigard, 2004; Pia 
& Conway, 2008). As a result, patients who face an effortful task and have impaired 
executive functioning skills (e.g. organization, inhibition), will have poor performance 
that is substantially more negative than their self-report. In contrast, the lower-effort word 
recognition tasks may have posed a similar challenge to patients both with and without 
frontal lobe damage. In the 2007 Gallo et al. study, the recognition task was made more 
effortful by requiring subjects to engage processes beyond a sense of familiarity (the 
context-free sensation that something has been encountered in the past). AD patients 
appear capable of using familiarity to aid recognition into moderate or later stages of the 




solely on familiarity measures when attempting to distinguish between awareness in 
healthy cognition, MCI, and mild AD. 
Both executive and metamemory dysfunction are commonly linked to dysfunction 
in the frontal lobe, particularly the prefrontal cortex (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; Pannu 
& Kaszniak, 2005).  The frontal, medial parietal, and lateral-temporoparietal regions are 
part of the neural pathways engaged in healthy adults when retrieving memories or 
attempting to understand other people’s perspectives, known as the default mode network 
(Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). This network has shown reduced activity 
among AD patients, suggesting that there may be a link between dysfunction in these 
awareness-relevant areas and AD-related cognitive decline (Zamboni & Wilcock, 2011). 
In a meta-analysis of studies of memory awareness in MCI and dementia patients, 
there were significantly more subjective memory complaints among dementia patients 
than among MCI patients. A majority of the examined studies contained simple questions 
asking if subjects had trouble with memory. High sensitivity indicated that the measure 
typically predicted a “true” (as diagnosed by physician) dementia diagnosis, while high 
specificity indicated the measure accurately rejected a “false” dementia diagnosis. The 
pooled sensitivity (aligning with a physician’s diagnosis of dementia) of complaints in 
dementia was 43.0%, while specificity (aligning with a physician’s diagnosis of no 
dementia) was 85.8%. The pooled dementia positive predictive validity was 18.8% and 
pooled negative predictive validity was 93.7%. The pooled sensitivity of complaints in 
MCI was 37.4%, while specificity was 86.9%. The pooled MCI positive predictive 
validity was 31.4% and pooled negative predictive validity was 86.9%. The findings 




diagnosis of MCI or dementia, memory complaints alone are not a useful method for 
detecting these disorders (Mitchell, 2008). Awareness of memory measured in tandem 
with awareness of executive functioning may provide a more complete profile of 
cognitive loss. 
 
Limitations of summarizing awareness in a single domain  
Given the association between AD progression and memory decline, memory 
impairment is studied especially frequently within MCI and AD awareness research 
(Clare et al., 2011; Roberts et al., 2009). In earlier research designs, an older adult’s view 
on their memory ability was often gauged by a brief interview or a handful of multiple 
choice responses. As detailed below, this approach may mask subtleties inherent in 
cognitive decline. Furthermore, narrow study designs may exclude crucial information 
from other cognitive domains.  
In one such design, AD patients’ medical records were reviewed, including the 
clinical interviews, labs, and neuropsychological evaluations. Awareness was assessed 
through the single question, “Do you have a memory problem that makes your life more 
difficult or complicated?” In logistic regression analysis with dichotomized age (> 70 
years) and education (> 12 years), executive functioning was a significant predictor of 
awareness (R = 0.19, p = 0.003). The authors concluded that lack of awareness is related 
to declines in executive functioning and general cognition (Lopez, Becker, Somsak, Dew, 
& DeKosky, 1994).  
Although the association between awareness and executive functioning is 




For example, there is no way to know where the error in self-analysis occurred, i.e. a 
failure to update long-term self-knowledge vs. a failure to compare recent poor 
performance to long-term self-knowledge (Morris & Mograbi, 2013). Not only was self-
report limited to a single domain (memory), but also limited to a single question. This 
approach demands that patients summarize their views on their memories into a single 
statement, rather than allowing the nuance of rating memory higher in some settings than 
others (e.g. memory for dates as higher than memory for conversations). Overall, 
awareness was operationalized in a simplistic fashion within the study design, casting 
doubt on whether or not this form of awareness can distinguish between stages of AD.  
In a later study, 3,673 community-dwelling older adults were followed for 10 
years (one baseline visit and then three additional visits) through repeated administration 
of a 20-item word recall task, an activities of daily living (ADL) questionnaire, and a 7-
item memory screening. Subjects were considered to have memory complaints if they 
rated their memory as “fair, poor, or very poor” on a single question: They were asked to 
compare their memory to peers of their age. Subjects were classified as either cognitively 
normal or MCI based on responses to the above measures at a baseline visit. Based on 
longitudinal analysis, memory complaints did not significantly predict change on the 
above measures over 10 years. The authors concluded that such complaints could not 
distinguish normal cognition from MCI (Purser, Fillenbaum, & Wallace, 2006). 
This study contains methodological concerns that cloud the authors’ conclusion. 
For example, the sampling of memory complaints is extremely brief. In contrast to the 
more detailed sampling of ADLs, there is no data on what specific memory deficits 




difficulties in paying bills that are independent of her deficits in word recall ability. The 
lack of meaningful overlap between self-report and dependent variable violates a major 
assumption of awareness questionnaires; that any tasks compared to questionnaire ratings 
should allow a valid representation of a subject’s self-report ratings  (Clare et al., 2005). 
Providing additional and more detailed items as part of the questionnaire would help 
correct this problem. Furthermore, the authors were unclear if the word recall task 
involved multiple trials, or a comparison of immediate and delayed administrations. 
Comparing memory complaints to a only a brief screener and single word recall task 
carries the risk of discounting not only other cognitive domains that may affect memory 
awareness (e.g. executive function), but also other measures of memory and verbal 
ability.  
 
The Cognitive Awareness Model (CAM) and multidimensional anosognosia 
Analysis of the above studies suggests that awareness cannot be summarized in a 
single question or a single domain. Although memory is crucial to awareness, it appears 
to be intertwined with other domains in a manner that is only partially understood. In 
1998, Agnew and Morris proposed a nuanced model of memory encoding and self-
awareness. In this model, all adults possess a personal database of semantic memory 
(learned facts and general knowledge) that is continuously updated through episodic 
memory (an adult’s recall of events from their own life). By providing continuity, this 
store of memory allows an individual to both review past information and anticipate 
future self-relevant events. In people with normal awareness, new input of episodic 




However, new input that is inconsistent with the personal database will rewrite part of the 
database.  
The likelihood of a rewrite depends upon both the frequency and severity of the 
new information. For example, if an adult with normal awareness misplaces his car keys 
one morning, this will not affect his personal database for very long: New information 
(e.g. having an uneventful and efficient commute and workday) will soon be encoded to 
enforce his understanding that his memory is generally fine. However, if he misplaces his 
keys for five consecutive days, this will update his personal database with a message like: 
“My memory seems problematic.” He would also receive this update if, on the same day 
he misplaced his keys, he had trouble finding the way to his office and could not recall 
the name of his assistant. In either case, this message resulting from multiple failures is 
encoded into an abstract self-concept, rather than a more direct framing such as “I am 
having great difficulty finding my keys” (Agnew & Morris, 1998).  
The above model was revised several times in order to better explain the 
heterogeneous presentation of anosognosia. The latest version is known as the Cognitive 
Awareness Model (CAM). The 2013 CAM presents a hierarchical ordering of memory 
consolidation, beginning with sensory input (auditory, visual, and/or motor) and ending 
with metacognitive output and regulated behavior and/or affect (see Figure 1). The new 
CAM highlights executive functioning as a mid-level process in the hierarchy via a 
system dubbed Cognitive Comparator Mechanisms (CCMs). In a healthy system, CCMs 
will identify new self-relevant errors before they reach metacognitive awareness, 
behavior, or affect. This allows an individual to proceed with new thoughts and actions 




turns three times now on this road, maybe I should check a map for this neighborhood” 
(Morris & Mograbi, 2013). Using this model, the authors proposed three forms of 
awareness deficit:  
1) Mnemonic anosognosia, wherein a patient compares a cognitive error to the 
personal database, but the personal database is not updated. This may result in an 
overt acknowledgement soon after the error is made. In the case of the office 
worker described above, this could lead to the semantic construction of “I must 
have some memory trouble” immediately after forgetting the name of his 
assistant. However, the information quickly degrades and is not consolidated. It is 
not preserved in long-term memory and will therefore not affect metacognition 
hours later. When the personal database is rarely or never updated for an extended 
period of time, patients may view their cognitive abilities to be as good as they 
were years or even decades earlier. In these cases, episodic details of the distant 
past are the only salient details available. Patients’ self-concepts are thus 
“petrified,” referring repeatedly to the same outdated sources of self-relevant 
information (Klein & Lax, 2010; Mograbi et al., 2009).  
2) Executive anosognosia, wherein information flow to or from the CCMs is 
disrupted and a patient does not successfully monitor errors as they are made. The 
recent poor performance is not adequately processed through the personal 
database. Therefore, the patient does not incorporate the meaning and 
consequences of the failure into their self-knowledge. The patient’s error is either 
not acknowledged, or is acknowledged in its immediate aftermath without regard 




erroneously think “There is no problem. I do not need to know his name to do my 
job.” This contrasts with the genuine but transient concern present in mnemonic 
anosognosia. Without a direct connection to compare task successes and failures, 
performance monitoring becomes much less efficient.  
3) Primary anosognosia, wherein there is a dysfunction in the Metacognitive 
Awareness System (MAS), which exists at the top of the CAM hierarchy. This 
form of disorder, unlike mnemonic and executive anosognosia, may involve 
successful consolidation of memory into the personal database and successful 
error comparison. However, this persistent information will not reach conscious 
awareness. The CAM emphasizes that no single system is considered an 
awareness center, which underscores how implicit awareness of decline may still 
emerge for an older adult with primary anosognosia (Morris & Mograbi, 2013). 
For example, the office worker’s implicit awareness of forgetting the assistant’s 
name would still influence his behavior and affect. He might feel a sense of 
embarrassment whenever he encounters the assistant, or might place a staff 
directory prominently on his desk. However, if another colleague noticed this 
behavior and asked him if he was worried about forgetting names, he would not 
describe any difficulty with recall.    
In sum, the CAM presents awareness as both implicit and explicit, and advocates 
that implicit forms of awareness are more resistant to cognitive decline than their explicit 





Refining multidimensional awareness measurement 
Just as the CAM has become more nuanced with revision, awareness 
measurement has evolved beyond very brief sampling of subjective memory complaints. 
The following studies gather awareness data in more detailed and innovative ways than 
previously discussed designs. They also lay the foundation for future studies to broaden 
awareness measurement beyond the domain of memory. 
A cross-sectional study examined the 1998 Agnew and Morris model (Ansell & 
Bucks, 2006), recruiting 18 older adults with mild AD and 18 healthy controls. Subjects 
were asked to learn a 10-item word list over three trials and then complete a 20-minute 
delayed recall trial. They were then asked to predict their future level of recall after the 
third trial and after the delayed recall on a 5-point judgment scale. As expected, the 
healthy control group was significantly more accurate at estimating their ability than the 
mild AD group (F(1,34) = 15.11, p < 0.01). However, the AD patients gave a 
significantly lower estimate of their memory ability on the 5-point scale between the first 
and third trials (z (N = 18) = -2.17, p = 0.03), suggesting that these patients revised 
predictions downward between the back-to-back trials. A trend-level difference also 
emerged between the pre-testing and delay phases (z (N = 18) = -1.94, p = 0.05), but not 
between the third trial and the delayed recall trial. The overt but fleeting 
acknowledgement of memory problems reflects mnemonic anosognosia. In contrast, the 
healthy controls did not show significant differences between trials. Additionally, global 
memory awareness was assessed at the beginning of the testing session, after the third 
trial and after the delay trial with a six-item series of yes/no questions. The AD group 




the end of the third trial (t(17) = -2.67, p = 0.02), but not between the pre-testing phase 
and the delay phase or the third trial and the delay phase. The findings suggest that by 
incorporating working memory, predictions among AD patients can improve between 
brief estimations. 
The ability to revise predictions immediately between trials suggests transient 
awareness in early stage AD, even though said awareness was shown to be inferior to that 
of healthy controls. Following the 1998 Agnew and Morris model, these AD patients 
appeared to show mnemonic but not executive anosognosia. Specifically, they displayed 
brief awareness that memory was worse than the personal database indicated at the 
beginning of the test. However, they could not update the database with this new 
information. The trend-level finding that estimation accuracy did not return to baseline 
levels after a 20-minute delay suggests a weaker relationship between episodic memory 
and the personal database than the 1998 model proposed (Ansell & Bucks, 2006). 
However, a similar methodology using a 60-minute delay instead of a 20-minute delay 
found that estimations eventually returned to baseline levels. The CAM includes working 
memory information at the bottom of the hierarchy, where it directly follows the input of 
sensory information. Thus, differences in minutes could substantially affect results. This 
finding ultimately supports the 2013 CAM framework, wherein the direct paths from 
working and episodic memory to semantic memory (the personal database) are disrupted 
in mild AD, suggestive of mnemonic anosognosia (Stewart, McGeown, Shanks, & 
Venneri, 2010).  
Another cross-sectional study compared 92 AD patients and 92 case-matched 




Rating Scale (clinicians rating the AD patients' impairment on a 4-point scale), 
Subjective Rating Discrepancy (both the patient and an informant complete a 42-item 
questionnaire on memory ability in the patient’s everyday life), and Objective Judgment 
Discrepancy (estimating subjects’ accuracy after completing measures of verbal, visual 
and working memory). Objective Judgment was operationalized with the final score 
computing the difference between the patient’s expected performance (“How many items 
did you recall on the test you just completed?”) and their actual performance on the Rey 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT). The RAVLT includes five trials of recalling 
List A, followed by the distractor List B, followed by recalling List A again on 
immediate and delayed recall trials. Therefore, a subject has multiple opportunities to 
produce false positive words if they incorrectly verbalize items from the distractor List B. 
Both Subjective Ratings (t = 8.2, p < 0.001) and Objective Judgment Discrepancy (t = 
15.2, p < 0.001) indicated more anosognosia among the AD patients than the normal 
controls. Within the Objective Judgment Discrepancy measures, greater anosognosia (i.e. 
lower postdiction accuracy) was associated with more errors of intrusion, including 
immediate false positives (r = 0.47, p < 0.001) and delayed false positives (r = 0.52, p < 
0.001; Hannesdottir & Morris, 2007). Objective Judgment Discrepancy is based on in-
the-moment test performance, while the Experimenter Rating Scale and Subjective 
Rating Discrepancy integrate memory across a variety of settings and over a much longer 
period of time. As a result, the authors suggest that AD patients in this study may 
experience mnemonic anosognosia and/or executive anosognosia regarding specific 
instances of memory use, although this design does not directly distinguish between the 




term and broad self-knowledge (Hannesdottir & Morris, 2007). Notably, the three 
quantitative methods were not significantly related to each other via Pearson correlations, 
which suggests awareness is a multidimensional construct. Unfortunately, this study 
included both early and late stages of AD, which are known to have substantially 
different levels of memory ability and lack of awareness (Welsh-Bohmer & Warren, 
2006). Splitting the AD group into early and late stages could have resolved some 
confusion regarding primary anosognosia, which is thought to occur more frequently in 
the later stages of the disease (Agnew & Morris, 1998).  
Another cross-sectional study drew distinctions between executive and primary 
anosognosia. Eighteen older adult early stage AD patients and 18 normal controls each 
viewed a sequence of line drawings of common objects and were then presented with a 
series of word pairs. Subjects had to determine which word in each pair was previously 
viewed as a line drawing, and also rate the confidence of each guess on a 1-5 scale. After 
this session was completed, subjects and informants completed the Anosognosia 
Questionnaire – Dementia (AQD). Early stage AD patients were less likely than controls 
to express high-confidence in their word guesses (t = 3.10, p = 0.004). The AD patients 
also underestimated everyday problems compared to their informants’ reports (t = 2.96, p 
= 0.009). However, among self-ratings of everyday memory problems, AD patients 
indicated they experienced more impairment than controls (t = 2.03, p = 0.050). Greater 
anosognosia discrepancy on the AQD was correlated with lower recollection accuracy (r 
= -0.55, p =0.020) but not metamemory. The authors argued that, because more basic 
aspects of metamemory are spared in mild AD, these patients may use familiarity more 




judgments, which are unlikely to be updated to their long-term personal knowledge 
(Gallo, Cramer, Wong, & Bennett, 2012). 
Similar to the CAM, these findings suggest that short-term comparison (absent in 
executive anosognosia) is distinct from long-term metacognition (absent in primary 
anosognosia) (Morris & Mograbi, 2013). Success in long-term metacognition could cause 
informants to believe a patient does not have serious deficits in self-awareness. 
Informants may not recognize that a patient with intact metacognition (no primary 
anosognosia) may still suffer from mnemonic or executive anosognosia. This could delay 
a patient’s presentation to research and treatment. This also reinforces how both patients 
and informants in future awareness studies should be queried on both multiple cognitive 
domains and multiple types of impairment within those domains. This study method 
might be enhanced through a longitudinal design, given preliminary evidence that 
mnemonic or executive anosognosia may precede primary anosognosia in AD.  
The above studies incorporated elements of objective performance into their 
conceptualization of awareness in novel ways. Study components dependent on the 
judgment of patients or informants were generally examined in sufficient detail.  
Together, these findings suggest that preferred cognitive pathways used by healthy older 
adults gradually become unusable as cognition declines in AD. Additionally, they 
demonstrated how implicit awareness may emerge in the context of all three CAM forms 





Executive functioning awareness, memory in context, and longitudinal prediction 
The preliminary evidence suggests that executive and/or mnemonic anosognosia 
emerges before primary anosognosia among AD patients (Agnew & Morris, 1998; Gallo 
et al., 2012; Hannesdottir & Morris, 2007). Therefore, it may be most useful to examine 
their associated components of the CAM in order to detect changes between normal 
cognition and MCI, as well as between MCI and AD. Both mnemonic and executive 
anosognosia rely on systems in the middle of the CAM hierarchy. Executive functioning 
and its associated CAM systems, CCMs and the personal database, appear underexplored 
in comparison to the episodic and autobiographic memory systems at the core of 
mnemonic anosognosia (Clare, 2010). For example, a single verbal memory method is 
frequently the only measure of objective performance, most often list learning and recall 
(Ansell & Bucks, 2006; Mimura & Yano, 2006; Purser et al., 2006). As the field moves 
toward more nuanced measurement of awareness, it is necessary to compare memory 
awareness to awareness of other cognitive domains. As discussed below, a shift toward 
studying the information flow of the personal database and CCMs may enhance the 
diagnostic utility of awareness. 
Several studies show support for executive functioning components as relevant to 
anosognosia, either through distinctions in testing (Gallo et al., 2012) or neurobiological 
differences (Amariglio et al., 2012; Johnson et al., 2007). Many studies also suggest that 
awareness should be interpreted as a multidimensional construct (Ansell & Bucks, 2006; 
Hannesdottir & Morris, 2007; Mimura & Yano, 2006). Several relate awareness to 
known symptoms of MCI and AD, including the potential to broadly identify subjects at 




Johnson et al., 2007; Saykin et al., 2006). However, most studies do not provide evidence 
for awareness measures to identify the more subtle cognitive decline between MCI and 
AD, or between normal aging and MCI. There is also very limited use of longitudinal 
data, which has been shown as important in establishing relationships between memory 
complaints and awareness in MCI (Reid & Maclullich, 2006).  
In a recent review of MCI and mild AD self-report literature, executive 
functioning abilities were moderately correlated with other neuropsychological tests 
(Frank et al., 2011). Informant reports of executive functioning change on the Frontal 
Systems Behavior Scale (FrSBe) have been positively correlated with increases in other 
cognitive difficulties among older adults with MCI. However, the authors noted a lack of 
information on the relationship between executive functioning ability and patient self-
report on said ability. Furthermore, at the time of writing, few measures were available to 
assess patients' awareness of their executive functioning. The authors noted that self-
report appears to remain a reliable and valid method of evaluating cognitive status until 
moderate stage AD. However, the preserved domains between healthy cognition and 
moderate AD vary between patients (e.g. some patients had good executive functioning 
insight but poor memory insight). MCI and mild AD may therefore be the most 
informative stages of disorder to obtain patient feedback. 
Awareness measurement adds a new layer of complexity to the already 
challenging task of assessing executive functioning in a laboratory setting. Although 
research into executive functioning awareness is limited, studies have operationalized this 
awareness into several forms, from success at daily activities (Ott et al., 1996; Suchy, 




Mateer, & Hultsch, 2004) to error monitoring (Amanzio et al., 2013; Mathalon et al., 
2003). A common theme among such studies is that both executive functioning 
performance and awareness deteriorate between healthy aging and early stages of 
dementia.  
In a study of awareness among normal control elders and AD patients, subjects 
completed the Dementia Rating Scale (DRS), a sensitive measure of cognitive 
functioning split into five subtests. Before each subtest, subjects were provided general 
instructions on what they were about to complete, and asked if they thought they would 
succeed (measured dichotomously). Unlike normal controls, AD patients significantly 
overestimated performance on their overall predictions (t > 6; df = 62; p < 0.001). Among 
all subtests, the strongest correlation was between the Initiation performance score and 
the Overall awareness prediction (r = -0.55, p < 0.001). Notably, the awareness of 
Memory prediction was not correlated with any performance scores except for Initiation 
(r = -0.26, p < 0.05). This suggests that, compared to other cognitive domains, executive 
functioning performance may have an exclusive relationship to certain changes in 
memory awareness (Antoine, Nandrino, & Billiet, 2013).  
In suggesting that overt memory awareness is correlated with executive 
functioning performance but not memory performance, the 2013 Antoine et al. study 
reinforces how the comparison mechanisms within the CAM are critical to healthy 
(complete) metacognition. A breakdown within the CCMs (executive anosognosia) may 
be a precursor to more serious deficits in metacognition (primary anosognosia). 
Expanding the study to include an MCI population could help build a timeline of how 




for future studies to integrate executive functioning and memory awareness. The overall 
method could be enhanced with a larger sample, longitudinal observation, and ratings of 
specific skills within the domains of memory and executive functioning.  
 
Research questions and hypotheses: 
The present study examined the relationship between executive functioning 
awareness and cognitive performance (general, memory, and executive) over time. 
Within the CAM, a reduced awareness of executive functioning ability (e.g. organization, 
dividing attention) suggests CCM dysfunction due to a lack of comparison between new 
incoming information and the personal database of extant knowledge (Morris & Mograbi, 
2013). Greater dysfunction in this system indicates less frequent updates to the database, 
and the patient thus relies on increasingly outdated information. As updates become less 
frequent, both metacognitive output and behavior/affect regulation are likely to decrease. 
Therefore, unawareness of executive dysfunction may predict future cognition decline, 
including disease progression toward MCI and/or AD. 
The present study addressed the following research questions: 
1) Can older adults’ executive functioning awareness serve as a predictor of 
future cognitive decline? Based on previous cross-sectional designs, executive 
functioning awareness appears positively correlated with cognitive abilities in 
multiple domains. It was hypothesized that lower executive functioning 
awareness (as compared to informant rating) at a baseline visit would predict 
lower scores on measures of executive functioning and memory performance 




2) Can older adults’ executive functioning awareness serve as a predictor of 
diagnostic change? It was hypothesized that lower executive functioning 
awareness (as compared to informant rating) at a baseline visit would yield a 
greater rate of diagnostic conversion from normal cognition toward MCI and 
AD at 12-month and 24-month follow-up.   
3) Does older adults’ objective memory performance moderate the relationship 
between executive functioning awareness and future cognitive decline?  Based 
on the 2013 CAM, dysfunction in episodic memory can hinder the flow of 
information into the executive system (CCMs) that compares new errors to 
existing self-relevant information. It was hypothesized that poorer memory 
performance at the baseline visit would increase the predictive ability of 
executive functioning awareness (e.g. the CCMs would be less effective when 
items lower in the hierarchy were impaired), yielding lower scores on both 












 The data for this study was drawn from the Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging 
Initiative (ADNI) database, which includes English and/or Spanish speaking older adults 
from 55 sites across the United States and Canada. Subjects included 661 older adults 
(enrollment ages 55-90). At baseline, each received a diagnosis of normal cognition (n = 
173), MCI (n = 410), or mild AD (n = 78). All subjects were paired with a study partner: 
a friend or family member with at least 10 hours of weekly contact and who accompanied 
the subject to each ADNI visit. Each subject completed a neuropsychological testing 
battery, and each subject and a matched study partner completed the Everyday Cognition 
measure (see Measures section, below) at a baseline visit and at 12-month follow-up. Of 
these 661 subject/study partner pairs, 247 also completed these measures at 24-month 
follow-up.  
 To qualify as an ADNI normal control (also known as “cognitively normal”), 
subjects must have had no subjective memory complaints (excepting mild declines 
associated solely with age). Normal controls required a mini-mental state examination 
(MMSE) score of 24-30 and a Clinical Dementia Rating (CDR) of 0. Cognitively Normal 
subjects must have also achieved one of the following scores on the Logical Memory 
Delayed Recall test: a) > 9 for subjects with 16+ years of education, b) > 5 for subjects 




 To qualify as either an ADNI MCI or AD patient, subjects must have had at least 
one subjective memory concern, which may have emerged from the patient, the study 
partner, or a clinician. MCI patients required an MMSE of 24-30 and a CDR of 0.5. MCI 
patients must have achieved one of the following scores on Logical Memory Delayed 
Recall: a) 9-11 for subjects with 16+ years of education, b) 5-9 for subjects with 8-15 
years of education, or c) 3-6 for subjects with 0-7 years of education.   
 AD patients required an MMSE of 20-26 and a CDR of 0.5-1.0. AD patients must 
have achieved one of the following scores on Logical Memory Delayed Recall: a) < 8 for 
subjects with 16+ years of education, b) < 4 for subjects with 8-15 years of education, or 
c) < 2 for subjects with 0-7 years of education.  
 Subjects were excluded at screening if they presented with major depression, 
bipolar disorder, a history of schizophrenia, or a history of alcohol abuse within the past 
two years. Due to the use of MRI in the ADNI protocol, subjects with partially metallic 
objects in their bodies (e.g. pacemakers) were excluded. Subjects with significant 
neurological disorders (excepting AD) were also excluded, including Parkinson’s disease, 
multiple sclerosis, or significant head trauma. 
 
Measures 
Everyday Cognition (ECog): 
The ECog is a 39-item questionnaire designed for informants to describe 
cognitive and functional decline. It has been adapted for patient self-ratings in these 
areas. Memory is represented as a single construct (“Everyday Memory”), made up of 8 




Planning” (5 questions), “Everyday Organization” (6 questions), and “Everyday Divided 
Attention” (4 questions). ECog Global ratings (composed of all 39 questions) are 
significantly correlated with age (r = 0.19, p < 0.05) and education (r = -0.16, p < 0.05), 
but neither ECog memory ratings or the three ECog executive function ratings are 
correlated with age or education. The ECog has been shown as reliable over a period of 
several months, as well as high in convergent validity with the CDR (Farias et al., 2008, 
2013).  
ECog ratings are made on a 1-4 scale, with the following options: 
1: better or no change compared to 10 years earlier 
2: questionable/occasionally worse  
3: consistently a little worse  
4: consistently much worse 
Higher ratings on the ECog indicate worse daily function. In addition, the patient 
or informant had the option to answer any question with “I don’t know.” Given the 
structured nature of ADNI data collection, this response was uncommon (< 1% 
responded “I don’t know” for most questions), but was coded as 0 when it appeared. As a 
measure of awareness, the ECog was operationalized as a discrepancy score between 
subject and informant rating. The discrepancy calculation took the form of Informant 
Score – Subject Score, which yielded larger positive numbers when the informant rated 







Geriatric Depression Scale – Short Form (GDS):  
Due to previous research indicating a correlation between increased depression 
and increased memory complaints (Minett, Da Silva, Ortiz, & Bertolucci, 2008; Smith, 
Petersen, Ivnik, Malec, & Tangalos, 1996), depression was included as a covariate. The 
GDS is a brief self-report measure designed to detect depression among older adults. It 
has been shown to be effective in the context of physical illness as well as mild and 
moderate stages of dementia (Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986). The short form of the GDS has 
been shown to be a reliable and valid screening for depression (Almeida & Almeida, 
1999). The GDS was administered as a direct interview with the subject alone. The 
questionnaire contains 15 Yes or No questions and asks the subject to reflect on how they 
have felt over the past week. Scores between 0-5 indicate little to no evidence of 
depression. Scores of 6-15 suggest evidence of depression, with higher numbers 
indicating more severe depression.  
Trail Making Test Parts A and B (Trails A and B):  
Trails A and B are the two components of a measure of executive function and 
processing speed. Both components require attention, visuomotor skill, and perceptual-
scanning under time pressure. Part B also requires substantial cognitive flexibility 
(Reitan, 1958). More time spent to complete both Part A (150-second maximum) and 
Part B (300-second maximum) indicates greater impairment. Part A includes 25 circles 
numbered 1-25, while Part B includes 13 circles containing numbers (1-13) and 12 circles 
containing letters (A-L). In Part A, the subject must connect the circles in ascending 
numerical order, while in Part B, they must alternate connecting circles in ascending 




corrected by the evaluator if they make an error, and urged to think further on what 
comes next in the pattern, e.g. “You were at number two. What is the next letter?” 
Although Trails B is the only one of these two scores directly measured in this study, 
subjects must complete Trails A immediately prior to Trails B for a standardized 
administration. Trails A and B have been shown to have both high test-retest reliability 
and high validity in detecting intact working memory, visuospatial ability, and task-
shifting ability (Giovagnoli et al., 1996; Sánchez-Cubillo et al., 2009). 
Clock Drawing Test: 
The Clock Drawing Test measures constructional ability and skill at following a 
sequence of verbal directions. It was included as a measure of executive functioning skill, 
where it has been shown to be both valid as a dementia screening and high in test-retest 
reliability (Brodaty & Moore, 1997; Ismail, Rajji, & Shulman, 2010; Schmidtke & 
Olbrich, 2007; Shulman, 2000). Subjects are provided a blank sheet of paper and 
instructed to “Draw the face of a clock showing the numbers and two hands set to ten 
after eleven” (Goodglass & Kaplan, 1983). It has been shown to distinguish between 
healthy cognition and AD among older adults (Cahn-Weiner et al., 1996). In the ADNI 
protocol, scores range from 0-5, with 1 point awarded for each of the following criteria: 
1) an approximately circular face, 2) symmetrical number placement, 3) correct number 
order, 4) the presence of two (and only two) hands, and 5) the shorter hand must point to 
eleven and the longer hand must point to two. Lower scores indicates greater impairment. 
Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale-Cognitive (ADAS-Cog): 
The ADAS-Cog was included as a measure of general cognition, with a focus on 




(Rosen, Mohs, & Davis, 1984). The ADAS-Cog has been shown to be both valid and 
reliable in detecting cognitive change, albeit with evidence of ceiling effects on some 
subtests (Cano et al., 2010; Monllau et al., 2007; Weyer, Erzigkeit, Kanowski, Ihl, & 
Hadler, 1997). It includes elements of learning, memory, language production, language 
comprehension, constructional praxis, ideational praxis, and orientation. This study used 
the inclusive scoring (85 point) method, which incorporates the following subtests: Word 
Recall (Immediate and Delayed), Commands/Instructions, Constructional Praxis, 
Naming, Ideational Praxis, Orientation, Word Recognition, Remembering Test 
Instructions and Comprehension, Word Finding Difficulty and Spoken Language Ability, 
and Number Cancellation. A higher total (i.e. more errors) indicates greater impairment.  
Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT): 
The RAVLT was included as a test of learning and episodic memory (Rey, 1964). 
It contains five word list learning trials, an immediate recall trial following an 
interference word list, and recall and recognition trials following a 30-minute delay. The 
recognition trial is presented as a paper sheet containing a combination of words from the 
original list and novel words: The subject must circle only the words that were part of the 
original list. Lower scores (i.e. lower number of words recalled and higher numbers of 
false positives on recognition) indicate greater impairment. The RAVLT has shown high 
validity in discriminating between dementia syndromes and moderate test-retest 
reliability over a one-year period (Macartney-Filgate, 1988; Ricci, Graef, Blundo, & 






Logical Memory Test Immediate and Delayed Recall (Logical Memory): 
Logical Memory is a modified version of the Logical Memory measure of the 
Wechsler Memory Scale – Revised (Wechsler, 1987) and a test of episodic memory. 
Subjects hear a single short story and are then asked to immediately recall as much of the 
story as possible to the examiner, with a maximum score of 25 points awarded for 
complete recall of the story content. Subjects are advised that they will be asked to recall 
the story later in the testing. After a 30-minute delay, subjects are again asked to provide 
as much of the story as they can recall, with a maximum score of 25. Lower scores in 
both phases of Logical Memory are indicative of greater impairment. Although 
independent reliability studies on this edition of the Logical Memory test are scarce, both 
the immediate and delayed recall components have demonstrated high validity in 
distinguishing memory performance (Leonberger, Nicks, Larrabee, & Goldfader, 1992).  
 
Procedures 
 All subjects completed clinical and cognitive assessment at a baseline study visit 
and for additional cognitive testing at a 12-month follow-up visit. A subset of the sample 
(n = 247) also completed 24-month follow-up cognitive testing. The study design was 
non-random (both in selection and assignment) and did not involve treatment for 
cognitive decline or dementia. Additional details regarding screening, biological 







All analyses were conducted using SPSS version 21 and AMOS version 21.  
To examine whether lower executive functioning awareness at a baseline visit 
would predict lower scores on measures of executive functioning and memory 
performance at follow-up, linear regression analyses were employed. Specifically, the 
relationship between baseline ECog discrepancy scores and follow-up performance 
scores were studied, with gender, age, years of education, and GDS ratings included as 
covariates. The dependent variables were 12-month and 24-month follow-up performance 
(continuous) on the following measures: Trails B, Clock Drawing, ADAS-Cog, RAVLT, 
and Logical Memory. ECog Executive Functioning (the combined ratings of Everyday 
Planning, Everyday Organization, and Everyday Divided Attention) was the covariate of 
interest.  
 To examine whether lower executive functioning awareness at a baseline visit 
would yield a greater rate of diagnostic conversion at follow-up, logistic regression 
analyses were conducted. They were used to examine diagnostic change either from 
Normal Cognition to MCI or MCI to AD, at both 12-month and 24-month follow-up (See 
Subjects section above for diagnostic inclusion criteria). They employed the same 
predictors as in the above linear regression aside from neuropsychological test 
performance.   
 Finally, to examine whether poorer memory performance at a baseline visit 
increased the predictive ability of executive functioning awareness (yielding lower 
cognitive performance at follow-up), path analysis was conducted. To observe memory 




baseline visit performance on Logical Memory Delayed Recall, subjects were split (a 
priori) into memory Impaired and Normal groups. Using a portion of the ADNI inclusion 
criteria for a diagnosis of “Cognitively Normal,” subjects were categorized as Normal if 
their scores on Logical Memory – Delayed Recall were a) > 9 for subjects with 16+ years 
of education, b) > 5 for subjects with 8-15 years of education, or c) > 3 for subjects with 
0-7 years of education.  Baseline discrepancy score on ECog Executive Functioning was 
an exogenous, continuous variable. It was used to predict 12-month and 24-month 
follow-up performance on Trails B, RAVLT, and ADAS-Cog.  Constraints were 
individually applied to paths from baseline executive functioning discrepancy scores to 
follow-up Trails B, ADAS-Cog, and RAVLT performance in order to test for significant 
differences between the Normal and Impaired memory groups. Additionally, each model 
was evaluated for goodness of fit.  
 Although there is no gold standard awareness method in the literature (Roberts et 
al., 2009), memory ratings are frequent and make a useful comparison to executive 
functioning ratings. Therefore, linear and logistic regression analyses were also 
conducted with memory discrepancy score as a covariate. These additional analyses took 
two forms: 1) memory discrepancy replaced executive functioning discrepancy as the 
covariate of interest, and 2) both memory and executive functioning discrepancy were 










Figures 2 and 3 are histograms of executive functioning and memory discrepancy 
scores, respectively. The executive functioning distribution had a mean of -1.11 (9.98) 
and the memory distribution had a mean of -1.61 (6.49). Both maintained an 
approximately normal distribution curve.  
Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations of demographic, self-report, 
and neuropsychological scores of the 583 normal and MCI (53.0% male) subjects 
involved in Hypotheses One and Two (linear regression and logistic regression, 
respectfully). The average age at the baseline visit was 72.1 (SD = 7.1). The average total 
years of education was 16.3 (SD = 2.6), indicating the average level of education was 
equivalent to a bachelor’s degree.  As expected given baseline recruitment criteria for the 
ADNI study, baseline GDS ratings were minimal, with a mean of 1.4 (SD = 1.5).  
Overall, scores on neuropsychological measures remained stable over time (baseline to 
month 12 to month 24, n = 583 to n = 231). (Note: The decrease in sample size between 
time points does not represent sample attrition, but rather subjects that have only been in 
the study for 12-23 months.) T-test comparisons between these two groups’ 
demographics, baseline discrepancy scores, and baseline performance scores did not 
show any significant differences.  
Table 1 also contains Pearson correlations between each variable and the baseline 




discrepancy was correlated with Logical Memory and RAVLT across all three time 
points, and ADAS-Cog at Baseline and Month 12. However, it was not correlated with 
the two executive functioning measures (Clock Drawing and Trails B), except Month 24 
Trails B. Memory discrepancy was correlated with every neuropsychology measure 
except Month 24 Clock Drawing. Overall, the correlations for memory discrepancy 
scores appear either comparable or superior to the correlations for executive functioning 
discrepancy scores. All significant correlations for both executive functioning and 
Memory were in the expected direction, i.e. lower executive functioning and memory 
awareness was correlated with lower scores on each measure among both. (The 
correlations for Trails B and ADAS-Cog appear positive because higher totals on these 
measures represent poorer performance.)  Both executive functioning and Memory 
discrepancy scores were also highly correlated with the other forms of baseline ECog 
measurement (executive functioning and memory subject self-ratings and study partner 
ratings).  
 Finally, Table 1 shows that baseline memory and executive functioning 
discrepancy scores were highly and positively correlated (r = 0.652, p <0.001). As an 
example of convergence across memory and executive functioning performance, poorer 
RAVLT and poorer Trails B were highly correlated at both Month 12 (r = -0.313, p < 
0.001) and Month 24 (r = -0.315, p < 0.001). Greater executive functioning discrepancy 
correlated more highly with poorer RAVLT at Month 12 (r =-0.156, p < 0.001) than 
poorer Trails B at Month 12 (r= 0.032, p = 0.437). In contrast, higher executive 
functioning discrepancy correlated similarly with poorer RAVLT at Month 24 (r =-0.202, 




discrepancy correlated with poorer Trails B at both Month 12 (r = 0.173, p < 0.001) and 
Month 24 (r = 0.146, p = 0.024). Overall, these correlations demonstrate modest 
convergent validity and low discriminant validity for executive functioning discrepancy 
scores (in the context of memory discrepancy scores) as predictors of future cognitive 
decline. 
 
Hypothesis One: Lower executive functioning awareness (as demonstrated via 
discrepancy score) at a baseline visit will predict lower scores on measures of executive 
functioning and memory performance at 12-month and 24-month follow-up.   
Table 2 details scores on executive functioning discrepancy and other baseline 
ECog ratings as predictors of poorer scores on Logical Memory (Delayed Recall) at 
Month 12 and Month 24, while controlling for the effects of age, gender, education, 
baseline GDS, and baseline Logical Memory score. The model as a whole explained 
approximately 57% of the variance among Month 12 Logical Memory scores (R2 = 0.57). 
The regression coefficient for executive functioning discrepancy (β = -0.077, t = -2.768, p 
= 0.006) indicated that poorer executive functioning awareness predicted poorer Logical 
Memory scores at follow-up. Additionally, the regression coefficients for gender (β = 
0.071, t = 2.514, p = 0.012), age (β = -0.104, t = -3.686,   p < 0.001), and education (β 
=0.058, t = 2.016, p = 0.044) indicated that being older, male, and having fewer years of 
education predicted poorer Logical Memory scores at follow-up. Executive functioning 
discrepancy was not a significant predictor for change in Logical Memory scores at 
Month 24. Table 2 also details a significant Month 12 prediction for study partner rating 




significant predictors in the same directions as in the original executive functioning 
discrepancy model. The model accounted for a similar level of variance (R2 of 0.57). 
Table 3 details scores on executive functioning discrepancy and other baseline 
ECog ratings as predictors of poorer scores on Trails B at Month 12 and Month 24, while 
controlling for the effects of age, gender, education, baseline GDS, and baseline Trails B 
score. The Month 12 model was not significant. However, the Month 24 model was 
significant and explained approximately 27% of the variance in Month 24 scores. The 
regression coefficient for executive functioning discrepancy (β = 0.126. t = 2.185, p = 
0.030) indicated that poorer executive functioning awareness predicted poorer Trails B 
scores. Additionally, the regression coefficients for age (β = 0.131, t = 2.129, p = 0.034) 
and baseline GDS (β = 0.117, t = 1.997, p = 0.047) indicated that being older and having 
more symptoms of depression predicted poorer Trails B scores. Table 3 also details a 
trend level Month 24 ECog prediction for subject rating (β = 0.106, t = 1.774, p = 0.077) 
and a significant prediction for study partner rating (β = 0.228, t = 3.973, p < 0.001). In 
each instance, increased age was a significant predictor of poorer Trails B score, but there 
were no additional predictions from baseline GDS. Each model accounted for similar, 
acceptable levels of variance (R2 of 0.27-0.30). 
Table 4 details scores on executive functioning discrepancy and other baseline 
ECog ratings as predictors of poorer scores on RAVLT (Delayed Recall) at Month 12 and 
Month 24, while controlling for the effects of age, gender, education, baseline GDS, and 
baseline RAVLT score. The model as a whole explained approximately 61% of the 
variance in Month 12 scores. The regression coefficient for executive functioning 




awareness predicted poorer RAVLT scores. Additionally, the regression coefficients for 
age (β = -0.105, t = -3.803, p < 0.001), education (β = 0.048, t = 2.987, p = 0.003), and 
baseline GDS (β = 0.086, t = -3.385, p = 0.001) indicated that being older, having fewer 
years of education, and having more symptoms of depression predicted poorer RAVLT 
scores. Executive functioning discrepancy was not a significant predictor for change in 
RAVLT scores at Month 24. Table 4 also details a significant Month 12 ECog prediction 
for study partner rating (β = -0.087, t = -3.120, p = 0.002). In this instance, age, 
education, and baseline GDS were significant predictors in the same directions as in the 
executive functioning discrepancy model. The model accounted for a similar, high level 
of variance (R2 of 0.61). 
Table 5 details scores on executive functioning discrepancy and other baseline 
ECog ratings as predictors of poorer scores on ADAS-Cog (13-item Inclusive Scoring) at 
Month 12 and Month 24, while controlling for the effects of age, gender, education, 
baseline GDS, and baseline ADAS-Cog score. The Month 12 model as a whole explained 
approximately 65% of the variance in Month 24 ADAS-Cog scores. The regression 
coefficient for executive functioning discrepancy (β = 0.076, t = 3.018, p = 0.003) 
indicated that poorer executive functioning awareness predicted poorer ADAS-Cog 
scores at Month 12. Similarly, the Month 24 model as a whole explained approximately 
64% of the variance in Month 24 ADAS-Cog scores. The regression coefficient for 
executive functioning discrepancy (β = 0.074, t = 1.806, p = 0.072) indicated that poorer 
executive functioning awareness predicted (at trend-level) poorer ADAS-Cog scores at 
Month 24. None of the regression coefficients aside from baseline ADAS-Cog score 




significant predictions for ECog study partner ratings at both Month 12 (β = 0.091, t = 
3.443, p = 0.001) and Month 24 (β = 0.087, t = 2.046, p = 0.042). In both instances, only 
baseline ADAS-Cog and the listed ECog score were significant predictors. Each model 
accounted for similar, high levels of variance (R2 of 0.65 in both models). 
Table 6 details scores on executive functioning discrepancy and other baseline 
ECog ratings as predictors of poorer scores on Clock Drawing at Month 12 and Month 
24, while controlling for the effects of age, gender, education, baseline GDS, and baseline 
Clock Drawing score. Executive functioning discrepancy was not a significant predictor 
for change in Clock Drawing scores at either time point.  
 
Hypothesis Two: Lower executive functioning awareness (as demonstrated via 
discrepancy score) at a baseline visit will yield a greater rate of diagnostic conversion 
from normal cognition toward MCI and AD at 12-month and 24-month follow-up.   
Table 7 details scores on executive functioning discrepancy and other baseline 
ECog ratings as predictors of diagnostic conversion (normal to MCI, normal to AD, or 
MCI to AD) from the baseline visit to Month 12, while controlling for the effects of age, 
gender, education, and baseline GDS. The model as a whole explained approximately 2% 
of the variance in diagnostic change (R2 = 0.02). Among the 583 subjects included in the 
Month 12 analyses, 43 converted to a more severe diagnosis. Among the 231 subjects 
included in the Month 24 analyses, 32 converted. Employing the odds ratio as a measure 
of effect size (Field, 2009), every point increase on executive functioning discrepancy 
was associated with a 1.05x increased likelihood of converting diagnosis (OR = 1.05, 




also a significant predictor of diagnostic conversion (OR =1.23, CI [1.01-1.51], p = 
0.040). However, gender, age, and education were not significant. Executive functioning 
discrepancy was not a significant predictor for diagnostic conversion at Month 24. 
Table 7 also details significant ECog predictions for Month 12 subject ratings 
(OR = 1.04, 95% CI [1.00-1.08], p = 0.030) and Month 12 study partner ratings (OR = 
1.07, 95% CI [1.04-1.10], p < 0.001), as well as a trend-level prediction for Month 24 
study partner ratings (OR = 1.04, 95% CI [1.00-1.07], p = 0.055). In each instance, 
gender, age, education, and GDS were not significant predictors. The odds ratios of the 
models indicated a 1.04-1.07x increased likelihood of converting diagnosis, and the 
models accounted for 2-4% of the variance (R2 of 0.02-0.04). 
 
Hypothesis Three: Poorer memory performance at the baseline visit will increase the 
predictive ability of executive functioning awareness, yielding lower scores on both 
measures of executive functioning and memory performance at 12-month and 24-month 
follow-up. 
To examine whether poorer memory performance at a baseline visit would 
increase the predictive ability of executive functioning awareness (yielding lower 
cognitive performance at follow-up), path analysis was used. These analyses employed a 
two-group model in order to observe memory performance as a moderator. The path 
analysis model contained the baseline ECog executive functioning discrepancy score as 
an exogenous variable. It was used to predict both baseline and either Month 12 or Month 
24 follow-up scores on Trails B, ADAS-Cog, and RAVLT as endogenous variables. 




linear regression. Logical Memory was excluded as a variable because the score was used 
to create the a priori moderator. 
Table 8 contained the demographics for the slightly larger sample used in this 
analysis (n = 661). This is larger than the previous sample because subjects with an AD 
diagnosis at baseline are now included. These AD subjects were excluded from the 
previous regression analyses due to their focus on predicting decline from normal or 
mildly impaired cognition. In the path analyses of Hypothesis Three, the goal was to 
observe memory moderating decline in executive functioning awareness prediction at any 
stage of impairment. The Month 12 model compared two groups formed a priori: Normal 
memory (n = 444) and Impaired memory (n = 217), for a total of 661 individuals. This 
model demonstrated excellent fit, (χ2(4)= 2.758, p = 0.599; χ2/df=0.690; CFI=1.00; 
RMSEA < 0.01). There were no significant differences between the Normal memory and 
Impaired memory groups when constraints were individually applied to paths from 
baseline executive functioning discrepancy scores to follow-up Trails B, ADAS-Cog, and 
RAVLT performance (see Table 9). In the Normal memory group, poorer baseline 
executive functioning awareness predicted poorer ADAS-Cog and RAVLT scores at 
Month 12. It was also associated with poorer baseline RAVLT scores (see Figure 4). In 
the Impaired memory group, poorer baseline executive functioning awareness showed a 
trend-level prediction for poorer ADAS-Cog scores at Month 12. It was also associated 
with poorer baseline scores among all three measures (see Figure 5). Constraining these 
paths to equality across the two groups did not significantly change model fit, which 




Next, the Month 24 model compared Normal memory (n = 202) and Impaired 
memory (n = 45), for a total of 247 individuals. The Month 24 model demonstrated good 
fit, (χ2(2)= 9.902, p = 0.042; χ2/df=2.476; CFI=0.990; RMSEA=0.08) Once again, there 
were no significant differences between the Normal memory and Impaired memory 
groups when constraints were individually applied to the paths from baseline executive 
functioning discrepancy to follow-up Trails B, ADAS-Cog, and RAVLT (see Table 9). In 
the Normal memory group, baseline executive functioning discrepancy showed a trend 
level prediction for poorer Month 24 Trails B scores, as well as a significant association 
with poorer baseline RAVLT scores (see Figure 6). In the Impaired memory model, 
baseline executive functioning discrepancy showed no significant predictions for Month 
24 measures or associations with baseline measures (see Figure 7).  
 
Uniqueness of executive functioning awareness in the context of memory awareness  
Memory prediction alone.  Memory awareness discrepancy scores have shown 
moderate associations with cognitive decline in previous awareness studies (Clare, 
2004a), and memory performance is critical to diagnosing both MCI and AD (Albert et 
al., 2011; Welsh-Bohmer & Warren, 2006). Therefore, these scores were included in 
follow-up analyses in order to compare them to this study’s more novel executive 
functioning awareness discrepancy scores. Poorer memory discrepancy scores predicted 
poorer follow-up performance on Logical Memory at Month 12 (β = -0.089, t = -3.177, p 
= 0.002) and at Month 24 (β = -0.103, t = -2.012, p = 0.045; see Table 10). There were no 
significant predictions from memory discrepancy scores on Trails B at Month 12 or 




performance on RAVLT at Month 12 (β = -0.067, t = -2.495, p = 0.013; see Table 12) but 
were not significant at Month 24. Poorer memory discrepancy scores predicted poorer 
follow-up performance on ADAS-Cog at Month 12 (β = -0.096, t = 3.770, p < 0.001) and 
at Month 24 (β = 0.110, t = 2.678, p = 0.008; see Table 13). Finally, poorer memory 
discrepancy scores predicted poorer follow-up performance on Clock Drawing at Month 
12 (β = -0.081, t = -2.178, p = 0.030; see Table 14) but were not significant at Month 24. 
In logistic regression analyses, poorer memory awareness predicted diagnostic 
conversion at Month 12 (β = 1.105, Wald = 16.854, p < 0.001) and at Month 24 (β = 
1.070, Wald = 4.863, p = 0.027; see Table 15). 
Linear regression combination. In order to examine the uniqueness of executive 
functioning awareness in the context of memory awareness, additional models were 
constructed. These re-estimated models examined executive functioning and memory 
discrepancy scores simultaneously. Each of the executive functioning discrepancy 
analyses described under Hypothesis One was re-estimated to include memory 
discrepancy as a covariate (see Table 16). Both discrepancy scores were highly correlated 
with one another (r = 0.652). In the Month 12 Logical Memory model, memory 
discrepancy was a trend-level predictor (β = -0.670, t = -1.825, p = 0.069), but executive 
functioning discrepancy prediction was not significant. Gender, age, and education were 
significant or trend-level predictors in the same directions as in the executive functioning 
discrepancy-alone model. This model also accounted for similar variance in cognitive 
performance to the original executive functioning awareness-alone prediction model (R2 
of 0.58). In the Month 24 Trails B model, neither executive functioning or memory 




alone model, increased age and elevated baseline GDS predicted poorer Trails B scores. 
This model also accounted for similar variance in cognitive performance (R2 of 0.27). In 
the Month 12 RAVLT model, neither executive functioning or memory discrepancy were 
significant predictors. Age, education, and baseline GDS were significant predictors in 
the same directions as in the executive functioning discrepancy-alone model. This model 
also accounted for similar variance in cognitive performance (R2 of 0.61). In the Month 
12 ADAS-Cog model, memory discrepancy was a significant predictor (β = 0.079, t = 
2.372, p = 0.018), but executive functioning discrepancy was not significant. In the 
Month 24 ADAS-Cog model, memory discrepancy was a trend-level predictor (β = 
0.105, t = 1.964, p = 0.051), but executive functioning discrepancy was not significant. In 
both Month 12 and 24 ADAS-Cog models, age, education, gender, and depression were 
not significant. Both models accounted for similar levels of variance in cognitive 
performance (R2 of 0.64-0.65). 
Logistic regression combination. Similar to the linear regression models above, 
the logistic models of executive functioning discrepancy prediction described under 
Hypothesis Two were re-estimated to include memory discrepancy as a covariate (see 
Table 16). In the Month 12 model, memory discrepancy was a significant predictor (OR 
= 1.101, 95% CI [1.03-1.18], p = 0.004), but executive functioning discrepancy was not 
significant. There was also a trend for GDS prediction for memory discrepancy (OR = 
1.22, 95% CI [0.99-1.49] p = 0.055). Similar to the original model, this version accounted 
for minimal variance in diagnostic change (R2 of 0.04). Neither executive functioning or 









Previous research has shown many cross-sectional relationships and several 
longitudinal predictions from memory awareness to cognitive decline (Clare, 2010; 
Ecklund-Johnson & Torres, 2005; Reid & Maclullich, 2006; Retz-Junginger, Supprian, 
Retz, Rösler, & Traue, 2005). Studies have also shown that both executive functioning 
performance and global awareness decline over time (Amanzio et al., 2013; Mathalon et 
al., 2003; Ott et al., 1996; Suchy et al., 2011; Van Wielingen et al., 2004). However, there 
has not yet been evidence of executive functioning awareness predicting longitudinal 
decline in memory or executive functioning performance, or of executive functioning 
awareness predicting change in diagnostic status. The following subsections will address 
the predictive ability of executive functioning awareness across this study’s three 
research questions. 
 
Research Question One: Can older adults’ executive functioning awareness serve as a 
predictor of future cognitive decline? 
 Hypothesis One stated that lower executive functioning awareness (as 
demonstrated via discrepancy score) at a baseline visit would predict lower scores on 
measures of executive functioning and memory performance at 12-month and 24-month 
follow-up.  This hypothesis was supported in a majority of measures. Poorer executive 




lower scores (i.e. change) on Month 12 Logical Memory, RAVLT, and ADAS-Cog, as 
well as Month 24 Trails B and (trend-level) ADAS-Cog. This relationship was not 
accounted for by gender, age, education, baseline depression self-report (GDS), or 
baseline scores on the respective measures. These findings provide evidence that 
executive awareness may predict longitudinal decline for both memory and executive 
functioning performance. 
A large number of negative discrepancy scores were also observed, wherein the 
subject rated their abilities less positively than their study partner. This resulted in an 
approximately normal distribution of scores. All of the results in this section arose from 
linear prediction, suggesting that more negative discrepancy scores are associated with 
less decline on testing.  However, this relationship is somewhat misleading. Significant 
rating discrepancy in any direction (significant overestimation or underestimation of their 
abilities) may be considered poor awareness. For example, a hypothetical patient with 
some memory problems may believe these problems have both greater breadth and depth 
than objective testing suggests. He may have a general understanding that his memory is 
declining, but lack specific details. He should therefore be considered to have poor 
awareness, rather than be considered worried but (relatively) cognitively intact (Clare et 
al., 2013). Despite this finding, all significant correlations and predictions involving 
executive functioning or memory discrepancy scores were in the expected direction. This 
suggests that if the negative discrepancy scores were removed or replaced with a score of 
zero (no discrepancy), many findings would likely show higher significance. 
A previous study found that variability in self-awareness of performance in 




older adults (Suchy et al., 2011). The ECog was designed in part as an update to the 
assessment of IADLs, one that would separate self-report into domains like memory and 
executive functioning (Farias et al., 2008). Furthermore, these findings complement 
Antoine, Nandrino, and Billiet’s (2013) cross-sectional study on awareness and cognitive 
performance. Their study found that, unlike other measured cognitive domains, poor 
memory awareness was correlated with poor executive functioning performance. The 
present study reveals a different relationship, with poor executive function awareness 
predicting poor memory performance. Therefore, poor executive functioning awareness 
appears linked to both memory measures like Logical Memory and RAVLT and 
executive functioning measures like Trails B. Overall, the present study’s findings 
suggest this longitudinal prediction method may provide earlier warnings of future 
decline than the more general questions of IADL functioning. The patient or their 
informant can endorse executive functioning difficulty alone, rather than difficulty with a 
complex task requiring multiple cognitive domains. Performance on tasks that require 
multiple domains is more difficult to interpret, as it is less clear how much impairment is 
due to one domain (e.g. memory) versus another (e.g. visuospatial ability).  
The Clock Drawing Test measures executive functioning and has been 
demonstrated as a valid dementia screening and high in test-retest reliability (Brodaty & 
Moore, 1997; Ismail et al., 2010; Schmidtke & Olbrich, 2007; Shulman, 2000). However, 
there were no significant relationships between executive functioning discrepancy score 
and Clock Drawing score. This may be due in part to ceiling effects. Average scores were 
very high on this measure, both among the full study sample and the sample with AD 




measure and executive functioning in previous literature, it may be an ineffective 
outcome measure for the milder impairment stages explored in this study (MCI and mild 
AD).  
 Greater executive functioning discrepancy scores at baseline was associated with 
poorer Logical Memory and RAVLT exclusively at Month 12. Neuropsychology scores 
remained relatively stable across all three time points (see Table 1), thus it is somewhat 
surprising to see inconsistencies between time points in regression analyses, as no cohort 
differences were observed between the two time points (n= 583 at Month 12 to n = 231 at 
Month 24). Additionally, reliability studies on Logical Memory are scarce and the 
RAVLT has questionable test-retest reliability after a 12-month period (Macartney-
Filgate, 1988; Ricci et al., 2012; Tierney et al., 1994). Together, these factors may have 
disrupted predictions. Additionally, Trails B was predictive for Month 24 but not Month 
12. Overt symptoms of executive functioning dysfunction often emerge later into AD 
progression than memory symptoms. Other components of Trails B, such as visuomotor 
skill and processing speed, do not typically decline in MCI or early stages of AD (Welsh-
Bohmer & Warren, 2006). There may be a delay between subtle executive functioning 
decline in daily activities and overt decline on testing. 
 Executive functioning discrepancy predicted ADAS-Cog scores at Month 12 and 
at trend-level at Month 24. Given the ADAS-Cog’s focus on behavioral dysfunction 
(Rosen et al., 1984), it may have had a stronger relationship with impaired executive 
functioning awareness compared to the memory measures. For example, maladaptive 
behavior is sign of dysfunction within the Cognitive Comparator Mechanisms (CCMs, 




to the other measures, ADAS-Cog also has more robust evidence for validity and 
reliability in detecting subtle cognitive change (Cano et al., 2010; Monllau et al., 2007; 
Weyer et al., 1997). Despite the study’s highly educated sample (average of 16.3 years), 
ceiling effects did not appear to disrupt the relationship to executive functioning 
awareness. The ADAS-Cog also takes approximately 30-45 minutes to administer, in 
comparison with other study measures requiring 5-15 minutes, allowing a greater breadth 
of memory and executive function evaluation.  
Memory comparisons. Memory discrepancy was shown to be an effective 
predictor in every case where executive functioning discrepancy is an effective predictor 
except for Trails B Month 24. Memory discrepancy’s broad success at prediction is 
expected, as poorer memory awareness indicating cognitive decline is relatively common 
in the literature (Clare, Whitaker, & Nelis, 2010; Mitchell, 2008). Furthermore, executive 
functioning discrepancy scores were no longer significant predictors when included 
simultaneously in predictions with memory discrepancy scores. Among Pearson 
correlations, modest convergent validity and low discriminant validity were observed for 
executive functioning discrepancy scores in the context of memory discrepancy scores. 
This may indicate that the executive functioning discrepancy scores have little unique 
variance after taking memory awareness into consideration.   
 The strong correlation between memory and executive functioning discrepancy 
scores may also have explained why memory lost predictive ability for both Logical 
Memory and RAVLT when included in the simultaneous model. These two tests 
exclusively measured memory, and thus it was expected that baseline memory 




similar predictor. Alternatively, it is possible that these measures are simply less sensitive 
to poor memory awareness than the other study measures. The high scores on these 
measures (as observed in Table 1) suggest that ceiling effects may have reduced 
sensitivity. Future research in a sample less likely to ceiling (e.g. lower education) would 
add valuable perspective.  
 
Research Question Two: Can older adults’ executive functioning awareness serve as a 
predictor of diagnostic change? 
 Hypothesis Two stated that lower executive functioning awareness (as 
demonstrated via discrepancy score) at a baseline visit would predict a greater rate of 
diagnostic conversion from normal cognition toward MCI and AD at both 12-month and 
24-month follow-up.  Poorer baseline executive functioning awareness discrepancy 
scores predicted diagnostic conversion at Month 12 but not Month 24. This relationship 
was not accounted for by gender, age, education, or baseline GDS.  
 Many studies have compared awareness to neuropsychological test performance, 
but few have compared awareness to change in diagnostic category. This may be partly 
due to the heterogeneity of methods used to create a diagnosis (performance on screening 
measures, clinician ratings, baseline self or informant report, etc.) Such studies also risk 
becoming outdated as diagnostic criteria may be revised over time (Albert et al., 2011; 
Clare, 2010). As such, there is very little context available for these results in the extant 
literature. In a longitudinal study using informant-subject discrepancy ratings (Galeone, 
Pappalardo, Chieffi, Iavarone, & Carlomagno, 2011), both MCI and mild AD were 




and AD scores were not significantly different from each other. These findings concur 
with the present study by suggesting discrepancy scores can help make a binary 
distinction between no impairment and some impairment.  
In contrast to the linear regressions in Hypothesis One, R2 values were very small 
(0.02 – 0.04) in all models. Their small size may be related to the small number of 
diagnostic conversions overall – 43 of 583 (7.4%) at Month 12, and 32 of 231 (13.9%) at 
Month 24. As the ADNI study is still ongoing, data may emerge in the future to better 
explain these findings, e.g. post-mortem analyses, and determine if there were any 
confounds in the study demographics.  
Memory comparisons. Unlike executive functioning discrepancy, memory 
discrepancy was an effective predictor for both time points. Moreover, in a model where 
memory and executive functioning discrepancy scores were both covariates, memory 
discrepancy remained a predictor at Month 12 and a trend-level predictor at Month 24, 
while executive functioning was not significant at either time point. Models of memory 
discrepancy both alone and with executive functioning discrepancy also contained very 
small R2 values (0.02 – 0.07), possibly reflecting the small number of conversions overall. 
 
Research Question Three: Does older adults’ objective memory performance moderate 
the relationship between executive functioning awareness and future cognitive decline? 
It was hypothesized that poorer memory performance at the baseline visit would 
increase the predictive ability of executive functioning awareness, yielding lower scores 
on both measures of executive functioning and memory performance at 12-month and 24-




predictive ability of executive functioning awareness at either Month 12 or Month 24. A 
Logical Memory score below a cutoff (as detailed in by the ADNI guidelines reported in 
Methods) was used to approximate patients having memory difficulties consistent with 
MCI and mild AD. Poor episodic memory is known to manifest in MCI patients who 
progress to AD within several years (Albert et al., 2011). However, poor episodic 
memory does not guarantee poor awareness, as AD patients may use familiarity to retain 
awareness even as memory performance declines. This phenomenon has been observed 
for memory awareness and broad metacognition (Gallo et al., 2012; Pannu & Kaszniak, 
2005; Souchay, 2007) but not specifically in executive functioning awareness (see 
discussion of the CAM model below). 
 
Modeling the findings 
In the path analysis model, it was expected that dysfunction in episodic memory 
would hinder the flow of information into the executive system. In the CAM, the 
Cognitive Comparator Mechanisms (CCMs, the systems which identify new self-relevant 
errors) would have more difficulty detecting and comparing new errors to the personal 
database when memory is impaired (Morris & Mograbi, 2013).  However, there were no 
significant differences between the subjects with and without episodic memory 
dysfunction. These findings raise questions over component interaction within the CAM. 
For example, do older adults experience memory problems typical of mnemonic 
anosognosia, e.g. dysfunction in episodic memory and the personal database, but mild 
enough that healthy CCMs could correct them? Can some components be so impaired 




information? Finally, if one component is impaired but can be corrected by another 
healthy component, does this change the form of the metacognitive output generated at 
the top of the hierarchy?   
 The lack of significant differences may relate to the bi-directional flow of 
information within CAM (see Figure 1). Lower-order components like episodic memory 
can both influence and be influenced by higher-order components like the CCMs (Morris 
& Mograbi, 2013). As there is no single awareness center in the CAM, healthy 
components can warn the subject (depending on their nature, either implicitly or 
explicitly) that an error has occurred. For example, if the episodic memory component is 
impaired but the CCMs are relatively functional, the subject may still be able to detect 
recent failures in poor memory and produce accurate executive functioning awareness. 
The awareness conflict is thus resolved before the information reaches metacognitive 
output, and the subject’s explicit statements on awareness, via the ECog, become similar 
to their study partner’s ratings. 
Regarding the linear regression analyses, the successful prediction of both 
memory and executive functioning objective scores is also consistent with the CAM. The 
CCMs appear impaired when a subject’s executive functioning awareness ratings at 
baseline are substantially more positive or negative than their future executive 
functioning performance. Dysfunction in the CCMs suggests additional dysfunction in 
the lower order components of episodic, working, and autobiographical memory. CAM 
does not offer any hypothesis on which form of anosognosia is most likely to precede the 
other in AD-related decline (Morris & Mograbi, 2013). If mnemonic anosognosia 




distributions observed among discrepancy scores. Patients with mnemonic anosognosia  
sense a cognitive problem immediately after making an error. However, they quickly 
forget the specific details necessary to describe the nature and extent of the problem, 
which could result in both over and underestimation of deficit. Mnemonic anosognosia 
also represents a decline in episodic memory. If mnemonic anosognosia occurred near 
baseline, this would partially explain how poor awareness predicted poor performance on 
memory measures like Logical Memory and RAVLT at Month 12, but not on an 
executive functioning measure like Trails B until Month 24.    
 
Implications 
This study contributes to the existing awareness literature for MCI and AD by 
demonstrating that executive functioning awareness, as operationalized through a 
subject/informant discrepancy score, is a predictor of future decline on 
neuropsychological measures. These measures included a combination of memory and 
executive functioning tests. In contrast to the typically cross-sectional awareness designs, 
it included longitudinal measurements over a two-year period. It did so in a manner 
similar though not identical to the more thoroughly explored construct of memory 
awareness, establishing some convergent validity.  
The subject/informant discrepancy score method of gauging awareness has shown 
moderate effectiveness in previous research (Clare, 2004a; Green et al., 1993), and may 
become more predictive when the questionnaires used ask intuitive questions about a 




method in this study, within both executive functioning and memory-based prediction, 
contributes to its overall construct validity as a measure of cognitive awareness. 
Previous awareness research focused heavily on self-reported memory 
performance. The literature indicated memory awareness had moderate utility for 
detecting decline, particularly from normal cognition to AD (Clare, 2010). Consistent 
with this literature, this study also demonstrated executive functioning awareness as 
predictive in many of the same domains as memory awareness, e.g. verbal memory, 
attention, conceptualization, etc. Given the pattern of both executive functioning and 
memory awareness losing predictive ability when included simultaneously as covariates, 
both predictors appear relevant to obtaining a diagnosis. Based on linear regression 
analyses, executive functioning awareness via discrepancy scores has moderate predictive 
utility as a measure of cognitive decline. Based on logistic regression analyses, it also 
showed modest predictive utility in detecting change in diagnostic status. However, based 
on Pearson correlations and regression analyses containing both executive functioning 
and memory discrepancy scores, executive awareness does not appear unique from 
memory awareness. 
The study findings also have implications in clinical settings. They provide 
evidence that brief assessment of executive functioning awareness discrepancy can 
predict worsening symptoms up to two years later, allowing a larger window for study 
and intervention. Low awareness of executive functioning may reach a primary care 
provider before low awareness of memory or other known forms of cognitive decline. For 
example, in linear regression models, poor baseline executive functioning discrepancy 




results suggest that mnemonic anosognosia may have preceded executive anosognosia in 
this sample (see discussion of the CAM model above), this study does not confirm that 
memory awareness deteriorates prior to executive function awareness or vice versa. 
Regardless of the order of symptom presentation, primary care providers and family 
members may benefit from additional education on the cognitive deficits that appear to 
follow poor executive functioning awareness.  
 
Limitations 
Some limitations should be considered when interpreting study results. First, 
several potentially useful demographics items were unable to be included in the study, 
such as ethnicity. Ethnicity has informed decline on several disorders of aging (Curry & 
Jackson, 2003) and would have been a useful covariate in both linear and logistic 
regressions. Study partner relationship status was also unavailable for a majority of 
subjects. Given that this study relies heavily on accurate informant reports, it would have 
been useful to observe the frequency of each relationship category (child, friend, 
significant other, etc.). This could have influenced the results if reports varied by study 
partner relationships, e.g. children providing lower overall estimations of subject abilities 
compared to friends. Additionally, this study’s sample may not accurately reflect the 
current generation of older adults. For example, the sample had an average of 16.3 years 
of education, indicating high intellectual achievement. Socioeconomic status (SES) was 
also absent from the dataset. SES, along with education, has previously predicted 
cognitive decline. Conversely, higher SES and education are associated with better 




susceptibility to cognitive decline due to more efficient and versatile neural networks; 
Rentz et al., 2010; Stern, 2002; Suchy et al., 2011). Some ADNI criteria, such as the 
exclusion of subjects with a history of schizophrenia, may have influenced the sample 
toward higher SES and education (Byrne, Agerbo, Eaton, & Mortensen, 2004). To 
increase generalizability, it would have been useful to include SES as an additional 
covariate and observe how it might vary with years of education.  
Second, despite including age as a covariate in the linear and logistic models, 
there may have been generational differences within the study sample. The study age 
range of 55-90 includes multiple age cohorts, and previous literature among older adult 
samples has shown that older cohorts consider mental healthcare less important (Currin, 
Hayslip, Schneider, & Kooken, 1998) and rate their overall health more favorably (Idler, 
1993) than younger cohorts. This might have influenced results in the present study, e.g. 
younger subjects may have been more likely to report cognitive decline than older 
subjects. Cohort effects would be most disruptive for the logistic analyses because ADNI 
excludes subjects from the “cognitively normal” category if they have any subjective 
memory complaints (excepting mild declines associated solely with age).   
Third, in the transition from Month 12 to Month 24, the study sample within the 
linear and logistic regressions decreased from 583 to 231, while the sample within the 
path analyses decreased from 661 to 247. This is due to many subjects not being enrolled 
long enough in the ADNI study to reach their Month 24 visit. However, no differences 
between groups were expected or observed. As this ADNI phase is ongoing, future 
studies may be able to compare samples that are closer in size (with disparity due solely 




Despite several limitations in sample characteristics and size, this study controlled 
for many other variables known to influence cognitive decline: age, gender, education, 
and symptoms of depression. This is the first study to examine executive functioning 
awareness as a predictor of longitudinal decline for MCI and AD. It is also the first to 
make direct comparisons between executive function awareness and memory awareness 
predictors among these diagnostic groups.  
 
Future Research Directions 
Future studies should continue to use longitudinal data. Longitudinal studies 
involving awareness discrepancy scores, both within subjects or between subjects and 
informants, are scarce (Clare et al., 2010; Reid & Maclullich, 2006). Existing study 
designs, such as those of Gallo et al. (2012) and Ansell & Bucks (2006) could be 
expanded to include subject/informant discrepancy scores and longitudinal observation.  
Additionally, there exists substantial heterogeneity within the MCI diagnosis, 
even considering the recently revised NIA-AA diagnostic criteria requiring cognitive 
complaints for a patient and/or informant (Albert et al., 2011). The present study 
combined normal cognition and MCI subjects. Future studies may wish to compare more 
forms of MCI over time. For example, new studies might include a sample of late-stage 
MCI patients, who are more likely to convert over 1-2 years than normal controls or 
early-stage MCI patients (Collie et al., 2002). Given that this study found evidence of 
longitudinal executive functioning prediction in MCI and mild AD subjects, other 
disorders may also show this effect. Unlike AD, disorders such as frontotemporal 




memory in their early stages (Welsh-Bohmer & Warren, 2006). It would be useful to 
compare each of these disorders to the population represented in the present study over a 
period of several years. Executive functioning awareness may prove an even stronger 
predictor of cognitive decline in these dementia groups. 
A detailed assessment of subject personality at baseline would complement the 
interview and depression scale used in the present study. For example, older adults with 
high levels of neuroticism are more likely to have cognitive complaints (Reid & 
Maclullich, 2006) and general health complaints (Moor, Zimprich, Schmitt, & Kliegel, 
2006). Anxiety is also positively correlated with increased cognitive complaints among 
older adults with mild AD (Derouesné et al., 1999). Future studies might include a 
comprehensive personality measure, such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory-2 Restructured Form (MMPI-2-RF; Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2011).  
Distinct among the results in Research Question One, executive functioning 
discrepancy score successfully predicted poorer Trails B performances scores at Month 
24, while memory discrepancy was not a significant predictor at Month 12 or Month 24. 
Future studies may benefit from comparing predictions for Trails B performance to 
predictions for additional measures of executive functioning, particularly more high-
ceiling tasks such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST). The WCST is a measure 
of executive functioning and examines a subject’s ability to organize, plan, and integrate 
frequent feedback (Stuss & Levine, 2002). The Stroop task also measures executive 
functioning via cognitive flexibility and selective attention, and has a high ceiling (Van 
der Elst, Van Boxtel, Van Breukelen, & Jolles, 2006). Finally, the Neuropsychological 




executive functioning abilities, including problem solving, mental flexibility, and 
conceptualization. It also includes a subtest on daily activities and safety precautions, 
which would complement the everyday activities that make up the ECog (Stern & White, 
2003). 
More novel forms of discrepancy scores, such as asking subjects to rate their 
performance both before and after a task (Ansell & Bucks, 2006; Gallo et al., 2012; 
Hannesdottir & Morris, 2007), could also be included in future investigations. This style 
of measurement is best suited to explore implicit awareness, which is thought to endure 
longer than the explicit awareness investigated via subjective discrepancy scores (Morris 
& Mograbi, 2013). Subject/informant discrepancy is not interchangeable with other 
discrepancy methods, such as within-subject pre/post-task performance rating described 
above. Each type may provide distinct and useful information about a subject’s 
impairment (Clare et al., 2013). Simultaneous, longitudinal measurements of both explicit 
and implicit awareness could confirm the existing CAM hypothesis that explicit 
awareness typically fades prior to implicit awareness. 
Additionally, tools such as PET and fMRI would also expand the study of 
executive awareness. There is increasing evidence for the default mode network 
stagnating as AD progresses, including reduced activity in frontal regions (Zamboni & 
Wilcock, 2011). Previous studies have established a connection between a compromised 
frontal lobe and increased executive dysfunction (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; Pannu & 
Kaszniak, 2005), as well as a connection between higher amyloid burden and increased 
subjective memory complaints (Amariglio et al., 2012). Future research should attempt to 




correlate with changes in executive awareness, and if these correlations also exist for 
memory awareness.  
Finally, future studies should expand the construct validity of executive 
functioning awareness to predict decline. Executive functioning awareness has a very 
limited history of prediction in research, and should be investigated with many more 
awareness operationalizations and outcome measures. As the literature grows, more 
direct comparisons to memory awareness can be made, which could increase discriminant 
validity between memory and executive functioning discrepancy scores. It may also be 
useful to include more questionnaires to examine more skills associated with the frontal 
lobe. The Socio-Emotional Questionnaire (SEQ) forms a subject/informant discrepancy 
score based on a subject’s awareness of their emotion recognition, empathy, social 
conformity, antisocial behavior, and sociability (Bramham, Morris, Hornak, Bullock, & 
Polkey, 2009). Decline in these areas is associated with frontal dysfunction (Welsh-
Bohmer & Warren, 2006), and further examination may show a relationship to executive 
functioning awareness. Finally, by using multiple questionnaires, future studies could 
also establish cut scores. For example, subjects could be placed into an impaired category 
if they had a large aggregate discrepancy score (either toward over or underestimating 
their abilities). Impaired vs. normal executive functioning awareness could then be used 
as a predictor in place of the continuous discrepancy scores in the present study.  
Although this study has expanded the scope of awareness as a diagnostic tool, 
many questions remain. The authors of the CAM noted that anosognosia as a whole has a 
heterogeneous presentation and the main causal factors are currently unknown (Morris & 




mnemonic and executive anosognosia, must be investigated further. Currently, changes in 
executive functioning awareness appear highly relevant to both forms of anosognosia. 
Studying these changes may be crucial to obtaining earlier and more accurate diagnoses 
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      Study Sample Characteristics and Correlations with ECog Scales – Normal and MCI Subjects 








Disc     
p-value 
              
Age at Baseline 72.1 7.1 0.020 0.630 0.100* 0.015 
Education (years) 16.3 2.6 -0.031 0.457 -0.041 0.322 
GDS-Baseline 1.4 1.5 -0.096* 0.020 -0.049 0.234 
ECog EF Subject 22.8 8.2 -0.507** <0.001 -0.251** <0.001 
ECog Memory Subject 16.5 5.7 -0.278** <0.001 -0.453** <0.001 
ECog EF Study Partner 23.0 11.0 0.632** <0.001 0.483** <0.001 
ECog Memory Study Partner 14.9 6.4 0.412** <0.001 0.609** <0.001 
ECog EF Discrepancy -1.1 10.0 . . 0.652** <0.001 
ECog Memory Discrepancy -1.6 6.5 0.652** <0.001 . . 
  
      
Logical Memory Baseline 9.1 4.2 -0.131** 0.002 -0.183** <0.001 
Logical Memory Month 12 9.8 5.4 -0.177** <0.001 -0.238** <0.001 
Logical Memory Month 24 10.2 5.3 -0.176** 0.007 -0.219** 0.001 
RAVLT Delayed Baseline 5.7 4.2 -0.146** <0.001 -0.231** <0.001 
RAVLT Delayed Month 12 5.5 4.6 -0.156** <0.001 -0.238** <0.001 
RAVLT Delayed Month 24 5.1 4.5 -0.202** 0.002 -0.199** 0.002 
Clock Drawing Baseline 4.5 0.8 -0.063 0.131 -0.128** 0.002 
Clock Drawing Month 12 4.6 0.8 -0.062 0.136 -0.145** <0.001 
Clock Drawing Month 24 4.6 0.7 -0.022 0.737 -0.048 0.461 
Trails Baseline 97.2 53.9 0.035 0.399 0.179** <0.001 
Trails Month 12 100.7 61.2 0.032 0.437 0.173** <0.001 
Trails Month 24 99.8 80.0 0.155* 0.016 0.146* 0.024 
ADAS-Cog Total Baseline 13.0 6.5 0.087* 0.036 0.220** <0.001 
ADAS-Cog Total Month 12 12.7 8.1 0.146** <0.001 0.269** <0.001 
ADAS-Cog Total Month 24 12.6 7.2 0.108 0.102 0.195** 0.003 
              
Note: n = 583 (53.0% male); Normal n = 173 (29.7%); MCI n = 410 (70.3%) 
GDS = Geriatric Depression Scale 15-Item Version; ECog = Everyday Cognition 
RAVLT = Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test - Delayed Recall;  
Trails = Trail Making Test Part B; 
ADAS-Cog = Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale-Cognitive (Inclusive Scoring)  






Table 2       
     
Linear Regression Model of ECog EF Predicting Logical Memory 
     
Model B    S.E. t Std-B p R2 
Month 12         
EF Discrepancy Logical Memory -0.042 0.015 -2.768 -0.077 0.006 0.570 
EF Subject Logical Memory 0.015 0.020 0.750 0.023 0.453 0.568 
EF Partner Logical Memory -0.044 0.018 -2.536 -0.076 0.011 0.570 
       
Month 24       
EF Discrepancy Logical Memory -0.036 0.027 -1.324 -0.068 0.187 0.440 
EF Subject Logical Memory 0.036 0.034 1.039 0.055 0.300 0.438 
EF Partner Logical Memory -0.018 0.031 -0.569 -0.031 0.570 0.437 
          
Note: n = 583 (53.0% male) 
Logical Memory = Logical Memory Test - Delayed Recall; ECog = Everyday Cognition 
All models controlled for Age, Gender, Education, Baseline GDS, and Baseline Logical 
Memory 





Table 3     
     
Linear Regression Model of ECog EF Predicting Trail Making Part B 
     
Model B  S.E. t Std-B p R2 
Month 12         
EF Discrepancy Trails B  -0.046 0.162 -0.282 -0.007 0.778 0.624 
EF Subject Trails B  0.281 0.216 1.303 0.037 0.193 0.625 
EF Partner Trails B  0.140 0.181 0.775 0.021 0.439 0.624 
       Month 24       
EF Discrepancy Trails B  1.022 0.468 2.185 0.126 0.030 0.270 
EF Subject Trails B  1.091 0.615 1.774 0.106 0.077 0.260 
EF Partner Month Trails B  1.988 0.500 3.973 0.228 <0.001 0.300 
          
Note: n = 583 (53.0% male) 
Trails B = Trail Making Test Part B; ECog = Everyday Cognition 
All models controlled for Age, Gender, Education, Baseline GDS, and Baseline Trail 






Table 4     
     
Linear Regression Model of ECog EF Predicting RAVLT 
     
Model B  S.E. t Std-B p R2 
Month 12         
EF Discrepancy RAVLT  -0.028 0.012 -2.244 -0.060 0.025 0.610 
EF Subject RAVLT  -0.010 0.016 -0.633 -0.018 0.527 0.605 
EF Partner RAVLT  -0.044 0.014 -3.120 -0.087 0.002 0.610 
       
Month 24       
EF Discrepancy RAVLT  -0.032 0.021 -1.521 -0.072 0.130 0.523 
EF Subject RAVLT  -0.017 0.026 -0.661 -0.032 0.509 0.519 
EF Partner RAVLT  -0.053 0.023 -2.285 -0.109 0.023 0.529 
          
Note: n = 583 (53.0% male); 
RAVLT = Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test - Delayed Recall;  
ECog = Everyday Cognition;   
  
All models controlled for Age, Gender, Education, Baseline GDS, and Baseline RAVLT 





Table 5     
     
Linear Regression Model of ECog EF Predicting ADAS-Cog 
     
Model B  S.E. t Std-B p R2 
Month 12         
EF Discrepancy ADAS-Cog 0.062 0.020 3.018 0.076 0.003 0.650 
EF Subject ADAS-Cog -0.001 0.027 -0.025 -0.001 0.980 0.645 
EF Partner ADAS-Cog   0.080 0.023 3.443 0.091 0.001 0.650 
       
Month 24       
EF Discrepancy ADAS-Cog  0.055 0.031 1.806 0.074 0.072 0.640 
EF Subject ADAS-Cog  0.001 0.037 0.002 0.039 0.969 0.630 
EF Partner ADAS-Cog  0.069 0.034 2.046 0.087 0.042 0.650 
          
Note: n = 583 (53.0% male) 
ADAS-Cog = Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale-Cognitive (Inclusive 
Scoring); ECog = Everyday Cognition; EF = Executive Functioning 
  







Table 6     
     
Linear Regression Model of ECog EF Predicting Clock Drawing 
     
Model B  S.E. t Std-B p R2 
Month 12         
EF Discrepancy Clock Drawing  -0.003 0.003 -0.922 -0.034 0.357 0.224 
EF Subject Clock Drawing  0.001 0.004 0.190 0.008 0.849 0.231 
EF Partner Clock Drawing  -0.003 0.003 -0.872 -0.034 0.383 0.232 
       
Month 24       
EF Discrepancy Clock Drawing  <0.001 0.004 -0.110 0.007 0.912 0.144 
EF Subject Clock Drawing  <0.001 0.006 0.019 0.001 0.985 0.144 
EF Partner Clock Drawing  -0.001 0.005 -0.106 -0.007 0.916 0.144 
          
Note: n = 583 (53.0% male) 
All models controlled for Age, Gender, Education, Baseline GDS, and Baseline Clock 










     
 
     Logistic Regression Models of ECog EF Predicting Diagnostic Conversion 
    
Model B S.E. Wald df Exp(B) p R2 
Month 12           
EF Discrepancy Diagnostic Conversion 0.044 0.015 8.929 1 1.045 0.003 0.020 
EF Subject  Diagnostic Conversion 0.038 0.018 4.738 1 1.039 0.030 0.020 
EF Partner  Diagnostic Conversion 0.067 0.014 23.974 1 1.069 <0.001 0.044 
 
   
       
Month 24        
EF Discrepancy Diagnostic Conversion 0.025 0.019 1.807 1 1.025 0.179 0.031 
EF Subject Diagnostic Conversion 0.015 0.025 0.372 1 1.015 0.542 0.020 
EF Partner Diagnostic Conversion 0.035 0.018 3.686 1 1.036 0.055 0.038 
            
Note: n = 583 (53.0% male); Normal n = 173 (29.7%); MCI n = 410 (70.3%) 
All models controlled for Age, Gender, Education and Baseline GDS. 







      
 
      Study Sample Characteristics and Correlations with ECog Scales – All Subjects 







Disc          
p-value 
              
Age at Baseline 72.5 7.3 0.080* 0.039 0.145** <0.001 
Education (years) 16.3 2.6 -0.099* 0.011 -0.073 0.060 
GDS-Baseline 1.5 1.5 -0.071 0.070 -0.045 0.244 
ECog EF Subject 23.0 8.5 -0.430** <0.001 -0.244** <0.001 
ECog Memory Subject 16.9 5.9 -0.179** <0.001 -0.384** <0.001 
ECog EF Study Partner 24.0 11.5 0.745** <0.001 0.586** <0.001 
ECog Memory Study Partner 16.3 7.4 0.569** <0.001 0.682** <0.001 
ECog EF Discrepancy 1.0 12.2 . . 0.721** <0.001 
ECog Memory Discrepancy -0.5 7.3 0.721** <0.001 . . 
  
         
Logical Memory Baseline 8.2 4.7 -0.335** <0.001 -0.345** <0.001 
Logical Memory Month 12 8.9 5.8 -0.350** <0.001 -0.366** <0.001 
Logical Memory Month 24 9.7 5.6 -0.249** <0.001 -0.281** <0.001 
RAVLT Delayed Baseline 5.1 4.3 -0.293** <0.001 -0.338** <0.001 
RAVLT Delayed Month 12 5.0 4.7 -0.281** <0.001 -0.325** <0.001 
RAVLT Delayed Month 24 4.8 4.5 -0.243** <0.001 -0.236** <0.001 
Clock Drawing Baseline 4.4 0.9 -0.250** <0.001 -0.264** <0.001 
Clock Drawing Month 12 4.4 1.0 -0.225** <0.001 -0.239** <0.001 
Clock Drawing Month 24 4.5 0.9 -0.167** 0.008 -0.161* 0.010 
Trails Baseline 107.4 65.0 0.271** <0.001 0.307** <0.001 
Trails Month 12 111.8 72.6 0.255** <0.001 0.305** <0.001 
Trails Month 24 103.9 82.6 0.174** 0.006 0.187** 0.003 
ADAS-Cog Total Baseline 15.0 8.7 0.377** <0.001 0.407** <0.001 
ADAS-Cog Total Month 12 15.2 10.9 0.410** <0.001 0.426** <0.001 
ADAS-Cog Total Month 24 14.3 10.2 0.306** <0.001 0.325** <0.001 
              
        
Note: n = 661 (53.7% male); Normal n = 173 (26.2%); MCI n = 410 (62.0%); AD n = 78 (11.8%) 
GDS = Geriatric Depression Scale 15-Item Version; ECog = Everyday Cognition 
RAVLT = Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test - Delayed Recall; Trails = Trail Making Test Part B;  
ADAS-Cog = Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale-Cognitive (Inclusive Scoring)  
 Logical Memory = Logical Memory Test - Delayed Recall 





   
  Path Model Comparisons of ECog EF Prediction 
   
Model χ2/df p 
Month 12     
Trail Making Test Part B 0.510 0.475 
Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale-Cognitive 0.034 0.853 
Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test - Delayed Recall 2.762 0.097 
   
Month 24   
Trail Making Test Part B 1.645 0.200 
Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale-Cognitive 0.352 0.553 
Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test - Delayed Recall 0.809 0.369 
      
Note: n = 661 (53.7% male) 
Month 12 Normal Memory n =444, Impaired Memory n = 217 
Month 24 Normal Memory n =202, Impaired Memory n = 45 








      
       Linear Regression Model of ECog Memory Predicting Logical Memory 
     
Model B  S.E. t Std-B p R2 
Month 12       
Memory Discrepancy Logical Memory -0.074 0.023 -3.177 -0.089 0.002 0.580 
Memory Subject Logical Memory -0.044 0.030 -1.475 -0.046 0.141 0.569 
Memory Partner Logical Memory -0.142 0.027 -5.215 -0.169 <0.001 0.590 
       
Month 24       
Memory Discrepancy Logical Memory -0.082 0.041 -2.012 -0.103 0.045 0.446 
Memory Subject Logical Memory -0.022 0.050 -0.436 -0.024 0.663 0.436 
Memory Partner Logical Memory -0.136 0.048 -2.845 -0.160 0.005 0.455 
          
Note: n = 583 (53.0% male) 
Logical Memory = Logical Memory Test - Delayed Recall; ECog = Everyday Cognition 







Table 11     
     
Linear Regression Model of ECog Memory Predicting Trail Making Part B 
     
Model B  S.E. t Std-B p R2 
Month 12       
Memory Discrepancy Trails B  0.207 0.249 0.831 0.022 0.406 0.624 
Memory Subject Trails B  0.385 0.380 1.014 0.036 0.311 0.625 
Memory Partner Trails B  0.615 0.265 2.319 0.065 0.021 0.627 
       
Month 24       
Memory Discrepancy Trails B  1.059 0.702 1.509 0.088 0.133 0.259 
Memory Subject Trails B  1.520 0.840 1.810 0.108 0.072 0.300 
Memory Partner Trails B  2.483 0.746 3.328 0.194 0.001 0.290 
          
Note: n = 583 (53.0% male) 
Trails B = Trail Making Test Part B; ECog = Everyday Cognition 
All models controlled for Age, Gender, Education, Baseline GDS, and Baseline Trail 






Table 12     
     
Linear Regression Model of ECog Memory Predicting RAVLT 
     
Model B  S.E. t Std-B p R2 
Month 12       
Memory Discrepancy RAVLT -0.048 0.019 -2.495 -0.067 0.013 0.609 
Memory Subject RAVLT  -0.038 0.023 -1.624 -0.047 0.105 0.607 
Memory Partner RAVLT  -0.091 0.021 -4.301 -0.126 <0.001 0.620 
       
Month 24       
Memory Discrepancy RAVLT  -0.041 0.031 -1.318 -0.063 0.189 0.522 
Memory Subject RAVLT  -0.065 0.037 -1.751 -0.085 0.081 0.525 
Memory Partner RAVLT  -0.110 0.035 -3.191 -0.156 0.002 0.539 
          
Note: n = 583 (53.0% male) 
RAVLT = Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test - Delayed Recall; 
ECog = Everyday Cognition 
  





Table 13     
     
Linear Regression Model of ECog Memory Predicting ADAS-Cog 
     
Model B  S.E. t Std-B p R2 
Month 12       
Memory Discrepancy ADASCog 0.120 0.032 3.770 0.096 <0.001 0.650 
Memory Subject ADASCog  <0.001 0.040 -0.012 <0.001 0.990 0.645 
Memory Partner ADASCog  0.154 0.036 4.280 0.123 <0.001 0.660 
       
Month 24       
Memory Discrepancy ADAS-Cog  0.120 0.045 2.678 0.110 0.008 0.640 
Memory Subject ADAS-Cog  0.088 0.055 1.614 0.071 0.108 0.634 
Memory Partner ADAS-Cog  0.232 0.049 4.710 0.199 <0.001 0.660 
          
Note: n = 583 (53.0% male) 
ADAS-Cog = Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale-Cognitive (Inclusive Scoring);  
ECog = Everyday Cognition 
  






Table 14     
     
Linear Regression Model of ECog Memory Predicting Clock Drawing 
     
Model B  S.E. t Std-B p R2 
Month 12         
Memory Discrepancy Clock Drawing -0.010 0.004 -2.178 -0.081 0.030 0.237 
Memory Subject Clock Drawing  -0.003 0.005 -0.507 -0.020 0.612 0.231 
Memory Partner Clock Drawing  -0.013 0.005 -2.739 -0.106 0.006 0.241 
       
Month 24       
Memory Discrepancy Clock Drawing  -0.001 0.007 -0.144 -0.009 0.885 0.144 
Memory Subject Clock Drawing  -0.010 0.008 -1.311 -0.084 0.191 0.151 
Memory Partner Clock Drawing  -0.010 0.007 -1.341 -0.084 0.181 0.151 
          
Note: n = 583 (53.0% male) 
All models controlled for Age, Gender, Education, Baseline GDS, and Baseline Clock Drawing; 







     
 
     Logistic Regression Models of ECog Memory Predicting Diagnostic Conversion 
    
Model B S.E. Wald df Exp(B) p R2 
Month 12           
Memory Discrepancy Diagnostic Conversion 0.100 0.024 16.854 1 1.105 <0.001 0.040 
Memory Subject Diagnostic Conversion 0.061 0.028 4.720 1 1.063 0.030 0.020 
Memory Partner Diagnostic Conversion 0.140 0.024 33.501 1 1.150 <0.001 0.070 
           
Month 24        
Memory Discrepancy Diagnostic Conversion  0.068 0.031 4.863 1 1.070 0.027 0.050 
Memory Subject Diagnostic Conversion 0.033 0.034 0.912 1 1.033 0.339 0.030 
Memory Partner Diagnostic Conversion 0.097 0.031 10.064 1 1.102 0.002 0.070 
            
Note: n = 583 (53.0% male) 
All models controlled for Age, Gender, Education and Baseline GDS. 






     
      Linear and Logistic Regression Models of Simultaneous ECog EF and Memory Prediction 
 Executive Functioning Memory  
Model Std-B p Std-B p R2 
      
Month 12 Logical Memory -0.035 0.336 -0.067 0.069 0.580 
Month 24 Logical Memory -0.002 0.975 -0.102 0.133 0.446 
      
Month 12 Trails B -0.037 0.281 0.046 0.183 0.625 
Month 24 Trails B 0.121 0.117 0.009 0.911 0.270 
      
Month 12 RAVLT -0.029 0.399 -0.048 0.170 0.610 
Month 24 RAVLT -0.054 0.385 -0.027 0.664 0.524 
      
Month 12 ADAS-Cog 0.025 0.438 0.079 0.018 0.650 
Month 24 ADAS-Cog 0.007 0.889 0.105 0.051 0.640 
      
Month 12 Clock 0.031 0.521 -0.101 0.039 0.238 
Month 24 Clock -0.002 0.985 -0.008 0.924 0.144 
      
Month 12 Diagnostic Conversion (Logistic) 1.003 0.889 1.101 0.004 0.040 
Month 24 Diagnostic Conversion (Logistic) 0.992 0.769 1.080 0.075 0.050 
            
Note: n = 583 (53.0% male); Normal n = 173 (29.7%); MCI n = 410 (70.3%) 
All models including both baseline executive functioning and memory discrepancy scores as covariates. 
GDS = Geriatric Depression Scale 15-Item Version; ECog = Everyday Cognition Scale 
RAVLT = Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test - Delayed Recall; Trails = Trail Making Test Part B;  
ADAS-Cog = Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale-Cognitive (Inclusive Scoring)  
























Figure 4. Month12 normal memory model of ECog executive functioning discrepancy 
prediction. Values are standardized. n = 444. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01.  









Figure 5. Month 12 impaired memory model of ECog executive functioning discrepancy 
prediction. Values are standardized. n = 217. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01.  









Figure 6. Month 24 normal memory model of ECog executive functioning discrepancy 
prediction. Values are standardized. n = 202. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01.  








Figure 7. Month 24 impaired memory model of ECog executive functioning discrepancy 
prediction. Values are standardized. n = 45. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01. 
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